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ARTICLE 67·MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

India and WTO Reform: Fair Rules for Developing Economies

India’s position at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is shaped by a dual interest: it wants a rules-based trading system, and it wants those rules to leave room for development, food security and industrial change. WTO reform should make the institution more…

Original editorial illustration for article 67: India and WTO Reform: Fair Rules for Developing Economies.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE 3D EXPLAINERMultilateral diplomacy and global governance

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question

India’s position at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is shaped by a dual interest: it wants a rules-based trading system, and it wants those rules to leave room for development, food security and industrial change. WTO reform should make the institution more effective without turning flexibility for developing countries into a temporary exception that disappears before…

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02The record

The WTO is built on negotiated agreements and member-led decision-making. Its rules cover tariffs, subsidies, agriculture, services and intellectual property, among other areas. The organization’s negotiating function has struggled to keep pace with changes in digital trade, industrial policy and global supply chains. Its dispute settlement system has also faced a prolonged…

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03What follows

India should support a WTO reform agenda that restores reliable dispute settlement, strengthens notification and deliberation, and advances negotiations on issues where members can find common ground. It should also insist that food security, development capacity and the special circumstances of poorer members remain part of the rules. The objective is neither unqualified…

Read the article and sources

India’s position at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is shaped by a dual interest: it wants a rules-based trading system, and it wants those rules to leave room for development, food security and industrial change. WTO reform should make the institution more effective without turning flexibility for developing countries into a temporary exception that disappears before their needs do. India’s challenge is to defend that policy space while also addressing legitimate concerns about transparency, predictability and the effects of domestic measures on trading partners.

The WTO is built on negotiated agreements and member-led decision-making. Its rules cover tariffs, subsidies, agriculture, services and intellectual property, among other areas. The organization’s negotiating function has struggled to keep pace with changes in digital trade, industrial policy and global supply chains. Its dispute settlement system has also faced a prolonged impasse over appointments to the Appellate Body. These difficulties affect all members, though countries with fewer resources can be especially reliant on clear, enforceable rules. (WTO: India Trade Policy Review, 2026; WTO dispute settlement gateway)

For India, food security is a central issue. Public procurement and stockholding programmes support food access and farmer incomes, but WTO subsidy rules can create tension when administered prices are measured against outdated reference periods. WTO members agreed in 2013 to a temporary “peace clause” for certain public stockholding programmes while negotiating a permanent solution. India has argued that developing countries need a durable solution that protects legitimate food-security policies. The broader negotiation must also consider transparency and safeguards so that support does not create hidden export distortions. (WTO: Public stockholding for food security; WTO agriculture negotiations)

Special and differential treatment is another dividing line. Developing and least-developed members often need longer implementation periods, technical support and flexibility to pursue industrial or social priorities. These provisions should be based on real capacity gaps and should not become a blanket exemption from obligations. At the same time, a self-declared category system can overlook differences between small vulnerable economies and large emerging economies. Reform should respond to evidence and negotiated criteria, rather than force a single formula onto diverse countries.

India’s protection of policy space also attracts criticism. Trading partners may object to tariffs, export restrictions or subsidies that affect their businesses and supply chains. India should answer those concerns through transparent notifications, clear measures and open negotiations. Defending development needs is more credible when domestic policies are predictable and when India engages with the costs imposed on others. Fairness requires reciprocal scrutiny, not a claim that every national measure is justified because it serves development.

India can make its WTO position more persuasive by pairing its defense of development flexibilities with clearer disclosure of its own measures. Timely notifications, publication of licensing rules and consultations before major policy changes can reduce surprise for traders and improve trust. Transparency does not mean that every national policy must be accepted by other members; it makes disagreement easier to assess against known rules. India should also distinguish measures that protect basic food access from those intended to support a commercial advantage. More precise policy explanations would help members negotiate a permanent public-stockholding solution without conflating food-security programmes with unrestricted export support.

A functioning dispute system is another shared interest. When members cannot obtain a credible resolution, smaller economies may be left with little practical recourse, while larger economies can rely on market power. India should support reforms that improve timeliness and preserve members’ ability to review legal interpretations. The design must avoid replacing the negotiated agreements with rules made by adjudicators, but it should still deliver binding and predictable outcomes. Restoring trust will require a bargain across issues: dispute settlement, agriculture, digital trade and special treatment cannot be resolved in isolation. India has leverage as a major economy and should use it to advance a workable package.

A negotiated solution on public stockholding should include transparency obligations that are practical for developing administrations. Members can report procurement volumes, release arrangements and stock levels in a consistent format, while protecting sensitive commercial information. Clear safeguards could prevent unintended export distortions without restricting the ability to maintain food reserves. India can propose workable notification schedules and technical assistance so that reporting requirements do not become a barrier for lower-capacity members. Credible transparency would strengthen the argument that food security deserves flexibility within a rules-based system.

Digital trade and industrial policy will also test the WTO’s ability to adapt. Members differ on cross-border data, electronic commerce, subsidies and local-content requirements. India should participate actively in negotiations and explain its regulatory objectives while recognizing the costs that inconsistent rules impose on businesses. Smaller economies need a voice in setting new standards, and developing members may need time and support to implement them. Reform should keep negotiated consent central while making the institution more responsive to trade realities.

India should support a WTO reform agenda that restores reliable dispute settlement, strengthens notification and deliberation, and advances negotiations on issues where members can find common ground. It should also insist that food security, development capacity and the special circumstances of poorer members remain part of the rules. The objective is neither unqualified liberalization nor permanent exception. It is a system that can manage trade disputes while allowing governments to meet basic social needs and build productive capacity under known rules.

Sources