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ARTICLE 19·TRADE AND ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

Indian Agriculture and the Politics of Trade Agreements: Protecting Farmers While Expanding Markets

Ibrahim Javaid

Original editorial illustration for article 19: Indian Agriculture and the Politics of Trade Agreements: Protecting Farmers While Expanding Markets.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINERTrade and economic statecraft

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question
02The record

Agriculture makes trade negotiations unusually consequential in India. A change in tariffs can affect farm prices, food processors, consumers and the costs of feeding livestock or making packaged foods. These effects do not fall evenly: a dairy farmer, a grape grower, a rice exporter and a city household may experience the same agreement differently. India’s approach—opening…

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03What follows

India’s trade policy should therefore be judged product by product and over time. The country can defend sensitive food systems while pursuing export access for marine products, spices, tea, horticulture and processed foods. It can offer consumers more choice without assuming that imports automatically harm farmers, and can protect producers without assuming that tariffs…

Read the article and sources

Ibrahim Javaid

Agriculture makes trade negotiations unusually consequential in India. A change in tariffs can affect farm prices, food processors, consumers and the costs of feeding livestock or making packaged foods. These effects do not fall evenly: a dairy farmer, a grape grower, a rice exporter and a city household may experience the same agreement differently. India’s approach—opening some markets while protecting selected products—is therefore a political choice about who bears adjustment and how the country can gain from trade without treating every crop as interchangeable.

The export opportunity is real. The Commerce Ministry reported agricultural exports of US$52.55 billion in FY 2025–26, up 2.8 per cent from the previous year. Rice accounted for US$11.5 billion; marine exports reached US$8.4 billion and spices US$4.3 billion. Those figures show an established export base, from staple commodities to higher-value foods. They do not show that free trade agreements caused the growth. Weather, world prices, production, sanitary approvals, logistics and government restrictions all affect annual results. The useful point is that Indian farmers and processors already serve world markets, and dependable access can matter to them. (Department of Commerce, agricultural export review)

Recent agreements show how India has tried to connect market access with domestic safeguards. The India–New Zealand FTA entered into force on 20 October 2026. New Zealand eliminated duties on all tariff lines covering Indian exports, creating an opening for Indian agricultural and processed-food products. India, however, excluded sensitive products including dairy, sugar, edible oils and key agricultural commodities from tariff concessions. Access for New Zealand apples, kiwifruit and Mānuka honey is limited through tariff-rate quotas, minimum import prices and seasonal windows. Their quotas are linked to agricultural productivity action plans, with cooperation intended to improve orchards, post-harvest handling and beekeeping. This design offers consumers some additional choice while giving domestic producers a measured transition and a chance to improve productivity. The conditions and cooperation are written into the deal; higher farm incomes are a hoped-for result, not yet a demonstrated outcome after only a few weeks in force. (Commerce Ministry entry-into-force release)

The India–EU agreement illustrates the same balance on a larger scale, but its status must be described accurately. Negotiations concluded in January 2026; as of 17 November, the agreement had not entered into force. India’s published summary says it has secured potential preferential access for products such as tea, coffee, spices, grapes, gherkins and processed foods, while excluding sensitive areas including dairy, cereals such as rice and wheat, poultry, some fruits and vegetables, nuts and edible oils. These are negotiated terms, not current tariff benefits that exporters can claim. Their value will depend on legal completion, the partner’s rules, compliance with food-safety standards and Indian firms’ ability to reach buyers. (Government of India’s FTA FAQ)

These choices are defensible because agricultural policy has to manage more than export earnings. India’s farmers operate across different climates, crops, farm sizes and market channels. An import surge in a highly exposed product can affect growers differently from a tariff cut on a product that India exports competitively. Keeping dairy or staple grains outside a concession can preserve policy space for sensitive supply chains; calibrated quotas can let trade expand in a controlled volume. In the opposite direction, lower tariffs on a foreign input can help processors and consumers, and better access abroad can reward producers who meet quality requirements. A negotiation that separates products and phases changes is more practical than either blanket protection or immediate, across-the-board opening.

Food security also belongs in the trade debate. The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture recognizes food security as a concern for members, and WTO members continue to discuss rules for public stockholding programmes used to buy and distribute food. Those debates are separate from any bilateral FTA schedule, but they reflect a real policy tension: governments want predictable trade while retaining tools to respond to hunger, price shocks and farm-income risks. India is right to defend that space. It should also explain why a safeguard is needed, how it will be reviewed and what complementary support will help farmers adapt. (WTO, food security and agriculture)

There is a serious counterargument to protection. Tariffs that make imported food or farm inputs more expensive can raise costs for households, restaurants, food processors and livestock producers. Shielded firms may have less incentive to improve productivity, while Indian exporters can lose leverage if partners see their own products shut out. A quota can limit risk but also constrain supply and competition. Nor does excluding a product from a trade agreement guarantee that small farmers receive a higher price: outcomes depend on procurement, transport, storage, bargaining power and access to credit. Safeguards need to be targeted and transparent, not an automatic answer to every request for protection.

India can make its negotiating choices more durable by pairing them with practical farm investment. Exporters need traceability, testing laboratories, cold chains, reliable ports and clear sanitary rules. Growers need extension services, better planting material and processing links that reduce waste and create value beyond raw commodities. The New Zealand action plans are a useful example of tying a narrow import opening to specific productivity cooperation, but delivery should be measured through outcomes such as yields, quality, post-harvest losses and farmer participation—not the launch of a centre alone. The Commerce Ministry has also stressed that SPS compliance, residue control and certification will be essential to sustain agricultural exports.

India’s trade policy should therefore be judged product by product and over time. The country can defend sensitive food systems while pursuing export access for marine products, spices, tea, horticulture and processed foods. It can offer consumers more choice without assuming that imports automatically harm farmers, and can protect producers without assuming that tariffs alone raise their incomes. The case for India’s negotiated safeguards is strongest when they are proportionate, reviewed regularly and accompanied by investment that helps farmers compete. That is a balanced form of economic statecraft: open the doors Indian producers can use, preserve room where abrupt exposure would be costly, and measure whether the resulting bargain improves resilience and opportunity.

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