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ARTICLE 99·INDIA AND A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

India as a Bridge Power in a Multipolar World

India is sometimes described as a “bridge power”: a country able to engage with states that disagree, connect developing-country priorities to major forums and cooperate across several political groupings. The phrase is useful only if treated as a description of…

Original editorial illustration for article 99: India as a Bridge Power in a Multipolar World.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE 3D EXPLAINERIndia and a multipolar world

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question

India is sometimes described as a “bridge power”: a country able to engage with states that disagree, connect developing-country priorities to major forums and cooperate across several political groupings. The phrase is useful only if treated as a description of diplomatic practice, not a claim that India can reconcile every conflict. India’s influence comes from its…

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02The record

India’s foreign policy has consistently emphasized independent judgment, strategic autonomy and participation in multilateral forums. Today it is active in institutions and partnerships that include the G20, BRICS, the Quad, the SCO, the UN and regional organizations. These memberships overlap but do not require identical commitments. India can discuss development and…

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03What follows

India can contribute to a multipolar order by connecting forums, negotiating practical cooperation and supporting more representative institutions. It cannot guarantee that powers will agree or that every partner will trust its choices. The bridge role is strongest when India uses access to create concrete outcomes and maintains consistent principles while retaining the…

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India is sometimes described as a “bridge power”: a country able to engage with states that disagree, connect developing-country priorities to major forums and cooperate across several political groupings. The phrase is useful only if treated as a description of diplomatic practice, not a claim that India can reconcile every conflict. India’s influence comes from its relationships, economic weight and willingness to work across institutions; it is limited by competing interests and the choices of other states.

India’s foreign policy has consistently emphasized independent judgment, strategic autonomy and participation in multilateral forums. Today it is active in institutions and partnerships that include the G20, BRICS, the Quad, the SCO, the UN and regional organizations. These memberships overlap but do not require identical commitments. India can discuss development and institutional reform with BRICS members, cooperate on maritime awareness through the Quad and maintain bilateral ties with countries outside both groupings. (MEA: India’s Foreign Policy; MEA Annual Report 2024)

The bridge role has practical examples. India’s 2023 G20 presidency brought the African Union into the G20 as a permanent member and produced a consensus declaration despite differences among major powers. The Voice of Global South Summits created channels for developing countries to share priorities. These initiatives expanded participation, but they did not erase divisions over security, trade or climate finance. Diplomatic success should be measured by durable follow-up, not the symbolism of a summit.

There is a counterargument: a state that seeks to maintain relations with every side can appear inconsistent or unwilling to defend principles. India’s positions on conflicts have sometimes drawn criticism from partners who expected clearer alignment. A bridge is credible only if it rests on clear principles—sovereignty, civilian protection, international law and peaceful settlement—and explains when national interests lead to a different choice. Strategic autonomy cannot mean avoiding accountability for how decisions affect others.

India also has material constraints. Its economic and military resources remain finite, and dependence on external technology, energy and markets can narrow its options. Effective bridging requires domestic capacity, a professional diplomatic network and sustained investment in regional institutions. It also requires listening: India cannot represent the Global South simply by asserting that role; partners must see their priorities reflected in action.

The bridge role can be tested through specific diplomatic outcomes. Did India help parties agree on a common text, create a channel for underrepresented states, mobilize resources or keep technical cooperation functioning during political disagreement? These questions are more useful than counting memberships or describing India as uniquely positioned. The G20 consensus in 2023 and the inclusion of the African Union were concrete achievements, though they depended on the agreement of all members and require follow-up beyond the summit.

Credibility depends on consistency across issues. If India invokes sovereignty in one context and appears to discount it in another, partners may question whether its principles are durable or selective. No country applies every principle without tension, but the government can explain its legal reasoning and the interests at stake. Open discussion of trade-offs is more persuasive than suggesting that strategic autonomy automatically resolves criticism. It shows that independent choices carry responsibility as well as freedom.

India should also distinguish between bridging and mediation. Mediation requires consent, sustained engagement and a willingness by parties to negotiate; a network of relationships alone is insufficient. India can facilitate communication, provide technical expertise or support humanitarian coordination when invited, but should not claim a role that parties have not accepted. Clear limits protect the credibility of its diplomacy and leave space for institutions or governments with a direct mandate to lead.

Domestic capacity underpins external influence. A large economy, skilled diplomatic service, strong research base and dependable defence and energy systems make partnerships more credible. India must invest in these capabilities while managing resource constraints and domestic priorities. Economic resilience also affects how freely it can make decisions when external pressure rises. Diplomacy across blocs is durable when backed by institutions and expertise rather than depending on high-level access alone.

A bridge power should create room for smaller states to speak in their own voice. India can support open consultations, reform international institutions and share technical expertise without claiming to represent every developing country. Partners will judge the approach by whether their priorities shape results, including finance, technology access and security. India’s influence grows when its convening power produces usable agreements and when it remains willing to listen after the summit closes.

A practical measure of bridge diplomacy is whether it leaves institutions stronger after a crisis passes. Contact groups, shared technical standards and regular consultations can outlast one leader’s initiative. India can invest in diplomatic staffing and follow-up mechanisms so that convening does not depend on a single summit or ministerial visit. Durable processes help preserve channels even when bilateral relations are under strain.

India can contribute to a multipolar order by connecting forums, negotiating practical cooperation and supporting more representative institutions. It cannot guarantee that powers will agree or that every partner will trust its choices. The bridge role is strongest when India uses access to create concrete outcomes and maintains consistent principles while retaining the ability to decide issue by issue.

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