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ARTICLE 64·MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

India in BRICS: Reforming Global Governance From Within

India’s participation in BRICS is best understood as an effort to shape global governance through a forum of major emerging economies. The grouping gives India a place to discuss development finance, trade, technology, climate and institutional reform with states…

Original editorial illustration for article 64: India in BRICS: Reforming Global Governance From Within.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE 3D EXPLAINERMultilateral diplomacy and global governance

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question

India’s participation in BRICS is best understood as an effort to shape global governance through a forum of major emerging economies. The grouping gives India a place to discuss development finance, trade, technology, climate and institutional reform with states whose interests overlap in some areas and diverge sharply in others. It is not a military alliance or a unified…

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02The record

BRICS has expanded from its original membership, making coordination more consequential and more difficult. At the 2025 Rio summit, leaders welcomed Indonesia as a member and recognized a group of partner countries. The declaration reaffirmed sovereign equality and consultation, and addressed multilateral reform, climate finance, artificial intelligence governance and health.…

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03What follows

India’s 2026 chairmanship offers a chance to turn that approach into an agenda, but the test is not the number of initiatives announced. It is whether members can deliver on development finance, trade facilitation, health and technology cooperation while respecting sovereign choices. BRICS is most valuable to India as one platform among several: a place to press for a more…

Read the article and sources

India’s participation in BRICS is best understood as an effort to shape global governance through a forum of major emerging economies. The grouping gives India a place to discuss development finance, trade, technology, climate and institutional reform with states whose interests overlap in some areas and diverge sharply in others. It is not a military alliance or a unified political bloc. India’s influence depends on working through those differences and showing that the forum can produce practical cooperation.

BRICS has expanded from its original membership, making coordination more consequential and more difficult. At the 2025 Rio summit, leaders welcomed Indonesia as a member and recognized a group of partner countries. The declaration reaffirmed sovereign equality and consultation, and addressed multilateral reform, climate finance, artificial intelligence governance and health. Those commitments set directions for cooperation; they do not prove that member states share a single position on security or international law. (Rio de Janeiro Declaration, 2025)

India’s interest in the forum includes reform of institutions such as the United Nations and international financial system. The case is that global institutions should reflect today’s distribution of population, economic activity and development needs. BRICS can help build negotiating coalitions and encourage financial tools that respond to infrastructure and climate priorities. But a larger group can also struggle to reach agreement, and declarations only matter when they lead to funded programmes, usable standards or coordinated positions.

The New Development Bank illustrates both promise and constraint. Its mandate to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development offers an institution associated with BRICS, while its lending still depends on project quality, risk management and members’ ability to support a credible balance sheet. For India, the bank is useful when it complements existing multilateral institutions and brings additional financing. It would be a mistake to frame it as an automatic replacement for the World Bank or regional development banks.

The expanded BRICS forum also includes states with different political systems, strategic partnerships and views on global conflicts. India can preserve its autonomy within the group by keeping cooperation issue-specific, insisting on consensus language and maintaining relationships outside BRICS. This approach carries diplomatic trade-offs: a cautious consensus may be less ambitious, while stronger positions can strain internal cohesion. India should be clear about which principles it considers non-negotiable and where practical compromise serves shared development interests.

The New Development Bank is one of the clearest institutional examples of BRICS cooperation. Its founding agreement sets out a mandate to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development, and its membership has widened beyond the original five countries. For India, the bank can be a useful complement when it finances projects on sound terms and works with other development institutions. It should be assessed by the quality of its portfolio, the transparency of lending, its environmental and social safeguards, and its ability to maintain a strong financial position. Institutional alternatives add value when they improve choice and standards, not simply when they carry a different label.

Expansion complicates the consensus that has been part of BRICS’ identity. More members broaden the group’s reach, but make common positions harder to negotiate and increase variation in economic priorities. India can help by keeping proposals specific, allowing voluntary participation where appropriate and ensuring that a shared declaration does not conceal real differences. This may limit the ambition of some communiqués, yet clearer and narrower commitments are more useful than broad language that no member implements. A diverse BRICS will need practical procedures for consultation, project selection and dispute management if it is to deliver benefits to its enlarged membership.

A practical Indian agenda could concentrate on projects where members share a direct interest. Development-bank coordination, disaster response, public health, energy technology and trade facilitation can produce measurable results without requiring a common geopolitical outlook. India should encourage open technical standards and transparent funding, and cooperate with institutions outside BRICS when that improves project quality. This keeps the forum connected to wider systems and reduces the risk that new bodies duplicate existing work without adding access or efficiency.

The group also needs to preserve space for internal disagreement. Members may differ on conflicts, sanctions, trade or the balance between state direction and private investment. India can state its position clearly and negotiate language that is specific enough to be useful. Where consensus is not possible, voluntary coalitions or pilot projects may make progress without presenting one member’s preference as a BRICS-wide commitment. A forum that manages disagreement honestly is more durable than one that suggests uniformity where none exists.

India can preserve autonomy by working with other members on defined outcomes while continuing to cooperate with the G20, United Nations and development banks. Cross-membership can help transfer useful proposals into broader institutions and reduce duplication. The value of BRICS will be measured by whether it gives members more practical choices and improves the quality of cooperation, not by whether it claims to replace other forums.

India’s 2026 chairmanship offers a chance to turn that approach into an agenda, but the test is not the number of initiatives announced. It is whether members can deliver on development finance, trade facilitation, health and technology cooperation while respecting sovereign choices. BRICS is most valuable to India as one platform among several: a place to press for a more representative order and to cooperate where interests align, without asking every partner to agree on everything.

Sources