India’s Indian Ocean policy is often described through the language of geography and sea lanes. For island states, however, maritime cooperation is also about everyday needs: safe fishing, reliable transport, disaster response, trained coast guards, ports that can handle trade, and the ability to protect sovereign waters. India has a strong case for building deeper partnerships across the region. That case is most persuasive when island governments set priorities and cooperation produces practical benefits that they can see and sustain.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced SAGAR—“Security and Growth for All in the Region”—during a March 2015 visit to Mauritius. India’s Ministry of External Affairs later described the vision as inclusive and grounded in respect for sovereignty, international law, freedom of navigation, peaceful dispute settlement and equal treatment of states. The ministry listed development cooperation, connectivity, disaster management, maritime safety and sustainable use of ocean resources among the areas of work. These are broad goals, not a treaty or a joint command. Their value depends on agreements and programmes that partner governments choose to pursue. (MEA’s SAGAR summary)
Mauritius illustrates how maritime ties can sit within a wider economic and diplomatic relationship. During his March 2025 visit, Modi and Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam discussed cooperation in development, trade, security and the wider Indian Ocean. Modi described MAHASAGAR—“Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions”—as a broader Global South agenda building on SAGAR. The joint statement presents the countries’ commitments as bilateral cooperation, not as an obligation for Mauritius to adopt India’s strategic positions. That distinction is essential to a durable partnership: shared interests can deepen without erasing a smaller state’s independent choices. (India–Mauritius joint press statement, 12 March 2025)
The Maldives offers another example of cooperation shaped by negotiation. In October 2024, the two governments announced a vision for a comprehensive economic and maritime-security partnership. The arrangement covered development and financial cooperation as well as security, showing that the relationship cannot be reduced to the presence or absence of uniformed personnel. In July 2025, the governments exchanged further agreements during a state visit. A Maldivian government update in August 2026 described ongoing work on the Thilamalé Bridge project. These records show continuing engagement, while also underscoring that the form of cooperation has to be agreed by both governments. (Maldives’ 2024 partnership vision; agreements exchanged in 2025; Thilamalé Bridge update, August 2026)
Regional training can turn a policy statement into working relationships. In April 2025, India deployed INS Sunayna as the “Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR” with 44 naval personnel from nine partner countries, including Comoros, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. The programme included shipboard skills, professional exchanges, port visits and maritime exercises. The Indian Navy reported coordinated surveillance activity during the voyage. Such work can help crews learn common procedures before emergencies arise. It does not create a standing alliance, bind participants to a common foreign policy, or transfer coastal states’ jurisdiction to India. (Ministry of Defence launch announcement; deployment completion report)
Humanitarian assistance is another practical strand. India’s Ministry of External Affairs records Mission Sagar deliveries to Indian Ocean countries including the Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles during the COVID-19 emergency. Naval ships carried food, medical supplies and other assistance when maritime logistics were useful. This record supports a concrete argument for regional cooperation: a ship that can move supplies may help bridge distance and damaged transport links. It does not prove that one-off aid alone builds long-term resilience. For that, countries need stronger local health systems, disaster agencies, ports and supply networks. (MEA Mission Sagar assistance record)
Maritime awareness matters as much as physical presence. The Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region, hosted by the Indian Navy, shares information with partner countries and agencies about maritime activity. Better information can support decisions on search and rescue, piracy, smuggling and illegal fishing. Yet a shared picture is useful only if partners trust the information, can protect sensitive data and retain control over how their authorities act. The centre can support national agencies; it cannot replace them. (IFC–IOR mission and partnerships)
Island economies also have interests beyond security cooperation. A port, ferry link or coastal project can matter for jobs, prices and access to health and education. India’s development partnerships can support connectivity and public infrastructure, but each project should be evaluated on its financing, procurement, environmental impact, maintenance plan and local benefit. Strategic visibility is not a substitute for due diligence. Publishing terms and delivery milestones makes it easier for partner governments and communities to judge whether an initiative meets their needs.
These partnerships operate in a region where island states maintain relationships with many countries and institutions. They have reason to diversify assistance, attract investment and preserve room for independent diplomacy. India’s influence therefore depends on the quality of its offer, not on assuming geographic closeness guarantees alignment. A cooperative approach should make clear that India respects each partner’s choice of partners, seeks consent for activities in national waters and treats commitments as reciprocal.
New Delhi can make its case stronger in four ways. First, it should ask partner governments to define the problem before offering a platform or project. Second, it should invest in capabilities that remain locally available after a visit ends: training, maintenance, communications and civilian disaster-response links. Third, it should give transparent updates on project financing, delays and outcomes. Fourth, maritime exercises and information-sharing should use clear procedures that protect sovereign decision-making. These steps would make the ideas of equality and inclusion measurable.
The Indian Ocean is too interconnected for India to stand aside, and too politically diverse for India to lead by assumption. The record—from bilateral agreements with Mauritius and the Maldives to multinational training and emergency deliveries—shows that India has tools for a constructive regional role. Its strongest long-term asset will be trust: partnerships in which island states shape priorities, keep their autonomy and gain practical capacity. That is how a security vision becomes shared regional value.