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ARTICLE 58·INDO-PACIFIC AND MARITIME STRATEGY

Maritime Cooperation With France and Japan

Research date: 17 November 2026

Original editorial illustration for article 58: Maritime Cooperation With France and Japan.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINERIndo-Pacific and maritime strategy

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question

Research date: 17 November 2026

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02The record

India’s maritime interests extend from the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal to the wider Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific. Trade, energy supplies, fisheries, disaster response and the safety of seafarers all depend on stable seas. Cooperation with France and Japan helps India build the practical capacities that support these interests: regular naval contact, shared awareness of…

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03What follows

The test of these partnerships will be whether they improve the safety and resilience of the Indian Ocean without narrowing India’s room to decide. Sustained dialogue, credible training and practical cooperation offer a way to protect India’s maritime interests while supporting a rules-based, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

Read the article and sources

Research date: 17 November 2026

India’s maritime interests extend from the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal to the wider Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific. Trade, energy supplies, fisheries, disaster response and the safety of seafarers all depend on stable seas. Cooperation with France and Japan helps India build the practical capacities that support these interests: regular naval contact, shared awareness of events at sea, training, maintenance and coordination against transnational threats.

These partnerships also show how India can cooperate closely while retaining freedom to make its own decisions. Neither relationship is a mutual-defence alliance. Their value rests on specific areas of shared interest, agreed through bilateral dialogue and exercised through activities that leave each government in control of its forces and policy.

France: a partner with an Indian Ocean presence

France is an Indian Ocean actor in its own right. Its territories and forces in the southwest Indian Ocean, including Réunion and Mayotte, give it responsibilities for maritime surveillance, territorial protection and regional cooperation. This geographic presence supports a sustained partnership with India, whose own security and economic interests are closely tied to the same waters. France’s armed forces describe the Réunion and Mayotte command as a regional base for protecting French territory, monitoring maritime zones and responding to regional threats.

The relationship has developed through regular exercises, ship visits and senior-level talks. In March 2025, the Indian and French navies held the bilateral VARUNA exercise, with participation by France’s carrier strike group. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ bilateral brief records this alongside port calls and participation in multilateral maritime exercises such as La Pérouse. Such activity gives the navies opportunities to practise communications and coordination at sea; it does not create a joint command or automatic commitment to take part in one another’s operations.

The eighth India–France Maritime Cooperation Dialogue, held in Paris on 20 May 2026, gave the partnership a current policy focus. The Indian and French co-chairs discussed operational coordination against piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and other hybrid threats. They also exchanged views on West Asia and the Indian Ocean. Their public statement reaffirmed international law, freedom of navigation, sovereignty and territorial integrity as shared principles.

This agenda is wider than conventional naval exercises. Illegal fishing and trafficking affect coastal communities and lawful economies; piracy and attacks on vessels threaten crews and commerce. Improving information exchange, maritime awareness and coast-guard or naval coordination can help countries respond before a local incident grows into a broader crisis. For India, cooperation with a partner that maintains forces and territory in the region can add practical reach, while India contributes its own regional knowledge and institutions.

Japan: linking exercises, awareness and maintenance

India–Japan maritime cooperation combines operational contact with growing institutional and technical links. At the seventh Japan–India Maritime Affairs Dialogue in Tokyo on 2 April 2025, both governments supported closer cooperation to uphold a maritime order based on the rule of law. They welcomed regular joint exercises and ongoing coordination for ship maintenance in India, and discussed future collaboration and multilateral frameworks, including coordination among India, Japan, the United States and Australia.

The two countries’ July 2026 annual summit added political direction. Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Sanae Takaichi said that Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and India’s MAHASAGAR approach were aligned in their aim of a prosperous Indo-Pacific where freedom and prosperity are protected. They called for deeper Indian Ocean training, naval vessel maintenance cooperation, and defence equipment and technology cooperation under Make in India. They also welcomed progress on transfer of Japan’s Unified Complex Radio Antenna, or UNICORN. These are stated priorities; their importance will depend on implementation and on arrangements that both governments choose to pursue.

Exercises provide one measure of how the relationship works in practice. In JIMEX 2024, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deployed destroyer JS Yuugiri and a submarine, while the Indian Navy sent INS Shivalik. The two sides practised anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, communications links, and cross-deck activity. JIMEX does not by itself establish a permanent operational arrangement, but repeated exercises can make ships’ crews more familiar with one another’s procedures and reduce friction when they operate in the same waters.

The 2026 India–Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation sets out a broader menu for practical work. It calls for more port visits, a common maritime picture through India’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, stronger action against piracy and other transnational crimes, and collaboration on disaster preparedness and assistance to third countries. It also supports logistics, repairs and maintenance and more complex exercises. This framework connects day-to-day naval contact with information sharing, coast-guard cooperation and regional capacity-building.

A practical case for Indian strategic autonomy

France and Japan bring different strengths. France has an established Indian Ocean presence and regular naval reach; Japan contributes advanced maritime and industrial capabilities, a growing maintenance partnership and close engagement with India on maritime awareness. Shared interests make cooperation useful, but they do not erase differences in geography, national policy or regional outlook.

For India, the sound approach is to convert broad commitments into limited, verifiable results: reliable channels for sharing maritime information, well-planned exercises, trained personnel, available repair facilities and cooperation that helps neighbouring states respond to disasters and illegal activity. These outcomes directly support India’s interests in safe sea lanes, sovereign decision-making and a stable region.

This approach also protects India’s strategic autonomy. A naval exercise or a joint statement should not be portrayed as proof that India has joined a bloc or accepted another country’s policy choices. Bilateral cooperation lets India work with France and Japan where their priorities converge, while retaining the ability to engage other partners and pursue diplomacy on its own terms. That flexibility is a strength when maritime challenges cross borders but the region’s countries remain diverse.

The test of these partnerships will be whether they improve the safety and resilience of the Indian Ocean without narrowing India’s room to decide. Sustained dialogue, credible training and practical cooperation offer a way to protect India’s maritime interests while supporting a rules-based, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

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