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ARTICLE 57·INDO-PACIFIC AND MARITIME STRATEGY

Sea-Lane Security and the Law of the Sea

Research checked: 17 November 2026

Original editorial illustration for article 57: Sea-Lane Security and the Law of the Sea.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINERIndo-Pacific and maritime strategy

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question

Research checked: 17 November 2026

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02The record

Sea lanes are the connective tissue of the world economy. They carry fuel, food, manufactured goods and people across distances that land routes cannot replace. For India, whose coastline faces the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indian Ocean, safe passage at sea is a direct economic and security interest. The strongest way to defend that interest is to pair…

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03What follows

Sea-lane security cannot be guaranteed by naval power alone. It also depends on predictable rules, reliable communications, capable coast guards, safer ports and cooperation among the states that share a maritime neighbourhood. India has a compelling interest in keeping those routes open. By linking that interest to UNCLOS and practical partnerships, it can protect national…

Read the article and sources

Research checked: 17 November 2026

Sea lanes are the connective tissue of the world economy. They carry fuel, food, manufactured goods and people across distances that land routes cannot replace. For India, whose coastline faces the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indian Ocean, safe passage at sea is a direct economic and security interest. The strongest way to defend that interest is to pair maritime capability with clear rules: shipping must be protected, coastal rights respected and disputes handled peacefully.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the central legal framework. India ratified the Convention on 29 June 1995. Its value lies in setting out different rights for different parts of the sea rather than treating every ocean area as either national territory or an unregulated commons. This distinction matters whenever a naval patrol, merchant vessel or coastal authority acts near a busy route.

In a territorial sea, which may extend up to 12 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baselines, the state exercises sovereignty subject to international law. UNCLOS also gives ships of all states a right of innocent passage through that sea. Passage must be continuous and expeditious, and it is not innocent if a vessel engages in activities prejudicial to the coastal state’s peace, good order or security. India’s 1976 maritime-zones law sets its territorial-water limit at 12 nautical miles. It also requires foreign warships to give prior notice and submarines to transit on the surface and show their flag. This domestic rule should be discussed alongside UNCLOS’s general wording, with legal clarity and predictable practice helping prevent needless friction while merchant ships continue legitimate passage.

The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) has a different legal character. It can extend up to 200 nautical miles, but it is not an extension of territorial sovereignty. Under UNCLOS, a coastal state has sovereign rights over natural resources and specified jurisdiction, including marine environmental protection. Other states retain freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, while owing due regard to the coastal state’s rights. India’s maritime-zones statute provides for an EEZ extending up to 200 nautical miles. A sound Indian policy should defend its resource and security interests without suggesting that ordinary navigation through the EEZ requires the coastal state’s permission.

Some questions remain contested. India recorded an understanding upon ratifying UNCLOS that the Convention does not authorize other states to conduct military exercises or manoeuvres in another state’s EEZ or continental shelf, particularly those involving weapons, without coastal consent. Article 58, meanwhile, expressly preserves navigation and other internationally lawful uses in the EEZ. The existence of differing interpretations is a reason for precise diplomacy and peaceful dispute settlement. It is not a reason to weaken the treaty’s shared rules or to assert that one country’s preferred reading binds every other state.

International straits have their own protections. In straits used for international navigation, UNCLOS generally provides a right of transit passage that must not be impeded. Ships using it must proceed without delay and follow applicable rules on navigation safety and pollution. States bordering a strait can designate sea lanes and traffic-separation schemes in accordance with the Convention, and the treaty calls on user states and coastal states to cooperate on navigational aids and pollution prevention. This balances the interests of coastal communities with the needs of global commerce. It also shows why India should support safety arrangements negotiated with littoral states rather than treat strategically important waters as a free-for-all.

The law also helps distinguish threats. UNCLOS defines piracy as certain acts of violence, detention or depredation for private ends on the high seas or outside any state’s jurisdiction. Similar attacks within internal waters, archipelagic waters or a territorial sea are classified by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as armed robbery against ships. That distinction affects which authorities can investigate and what cooperation is needed. Sea-lane security also includes attacks on merchant ships, navigational accidents, unsafe traffic and pollution. A single label cannot substitute for evidence, jurisdiction and a coordinated response.

India’s operational record gives its arguments practical weight. The Indian Navy has maintained anti-piracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. This work protects Indian-flagged shipping and Indian crews, but it has also assisted foreign vessels. A July 2026 response in the Gulf of Aden illustrates the broader role: after a piracy attempt on the St Vincent and the Grenadines-flagged Golden Arsenal, Indian Naval Ship Trikand assisted the vessel, while a P-8I aircraft supported surveillance. The ship’s 21 crew members were reported safe and the vessel resumed its voyage. Such operations show how a capable navy can protect commerce and life beyond its own flag without claiming authority over the entire route.

India’s case is strongest when maritime presence is paired with information-sharing and cooperation. The government’s account of its operations describes coordination with domestic agencies and international maritime-security partners. The IMO’s security framework likewise depends on ship operators, port facilities and governments implementing common safety and security measures. Shared reporting can help a nearby ship respond faster than a distant command centre; common routeing rules can reduce collision risk in crowded waters. These practical steps are more durable than unilateral declarations that confuse jurisdiction or deter lawful passage.

India should therefore make three commitments clear. First, it will defend its sovereign rights in its territorial sea and EEZ under the law. Second, it will uphold navigation rights and the safety of international sea lanes. Third, it will work with coastal states, flag states and international institutions when threats cross borders. This approach supports India’s strategic autonomy: New Delhi can decide how to deploy its ships while grounding each action in law, necessity and respect for other states.

Sea-lane security cannot be guaranteed by naval power alone. It also depends on predictable rules, reliable communications, capable coast guards, safer ports and cooperation among the states that share a maritime neighbourhood. India has a compelling interest in keeping those routes open. By linking that interest to UNCLOS and practical partnerships, it can protect national commerce while helping preserve the wider system on which all trading states depend.

Sources