The Indian Ocean is both a neighbourhood and a shared highway. It links coastal states and island nations whose security and economies depend on safe passage, functioning ports, fisheries, communications cables and disaster response. India’s SAGAR vision—“Security and Growth for All in the Region”—sets out how New Delhi says it wants to work in this maritime space: with partners, through practical cooperation, and with attention to development as well as defence. Its significance lies less in the acronym than in whether these promises can be translated into durable regional arrangements.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi first articulated SAGAR during his visit to Mauritius in March 2015. The choice of venue reflected the island country’s importance to India’s Indian Ocean policy, while the name, meaning “ocean” in Hindi, gave the initiative a regional frame. In a 2024 statement to Parliament, India’s Ministry of External Affairs described the vision as a free, open, inclusive, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific, grounded in lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and overflight, respect for sovereignty, peaceful dispute settlement and equality among states. The same statement listed practical areas of work: connectivity, capacity building, disaster management, sustainable development, maritime safety, and awareness of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. MEA’s SAGAR summary is a useful account of the official framework.
That breadth is deliberate. Maritime security is not only a question of fleets and deterrence. A coastal state may need trained personnel, hydrographic surveys, search-and-rescue links, coastal surveillance, or help during a cyclone. India’s approach has combined bilateral partnerships with regional forums and information-sharing mechanisms. The Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region, established by the Government of India in 2018 and hosted by the Indian Navy, shares information with partner countries and agencies to improve maritime awareness. Its work covers concerns such as piracy, smuggling, irregular migration and illegal fishing. Information exchange can help authorities notice risks earlier, although a centre cannot replace the legal powers, resources or decisions of each participating country. (IFC-IOR)
Humanitarian assistance offers a clear example of security and growth being treated as connected. During the COVID-19 pandemic, India’s “Mission Sagar” deployments delivered medicines, medical teams, food and other supplies to countries across the Indian Ocean and beyond. A Ministry of External Affairs record lists assistance in 2020 and 2021 to, among others, the Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Mozambique. These deployments used naval ships to move aid when maritime logistics mattered. They also built familiarity between governments and armed forces. The public record demonstrates what India delivered; it does not, by itself, establish how recipient governments assess the programme or whether one-off relief becomes lasting resilience. (MEA’s Mission Sagar assistance record)
In April 2025, India gave the idea a more visible training format by sending INS Sunayna on deployment as the “Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR.” The ship sailed with 44 naval personnel from nine partner countries: Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Tanzania. India’s Ministry of Defence described planned training in firefighting, damage control, bridge operations, seamanship and other shipboard skills. The Navy later reported port visits, joint exercises, professional exchanges and coordinated exclusive economic zone surveillance with partners during the month-long voyage. This is a concrete demonstration of interoperability: crews learn procedures together and build working relationships before a crisis. It is not a standing alliance or a guarantee that participating states will share every Indian strategic assessment. (Ministry of Defence, launch; deployment report)
The case for a cooperative maritime agenda is also geopolitical. India has described its Indo-Pacific outlook as inclusive and based on international law, while seeking to deepen ties with island states and littoral countries. Many of these governments have their own foreign policies and relationships with major powers. A regional vision framed as a shared public good can be more attractive than one that asks neighbours to choose sides. But words such as “inclusive” and “equal” have to be tested in practice: consultation, transparency, consent for activities in national waters, and respect for each country’s priorities matter as much as naval visits.
SAGAR’s reach has also broadened. During his March 2025 visit to Mauritius, Modi said the Global South vision would move “beyond SAGAR” to MAHASAGAR—“Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions”—with cooperation in trade, capacity building and mutual security. The announcement positioned the Indian Ocean concept within a wider development partnership agenda. It should not be confused with the Indian Navy’s earlier MAHASAGAR forum, whose name expanded to “Maritime Heads for Active Security and Growth for All in the Region.” The distinction matters: one is a broader political vision announced by the Prime Minister; the other is a naval chiefs’ engagement mechanism. (PM India, joint press statement with Mauritius)
Still, a vision statement is not an institution. SAGAR does not itself create a treaty, shared command or common maritime policy. Its delivery depends on separate bilateral agreements, budgeted projects, trained personnel, reliable equipment, and the willingness of partner governments to sustain cooperation across political changes. There is also an asymmetry: India has greater naval resources and often provides the platform, training or assistance. That can make partnerships useful, but it also places a responsibility on New Delhi to listen carefully and make cooperation visibly responsive to local needs. Claims of regional leadership are more credible when smaller states can shape the agenda and benefit in measurable ways.
The next phase should therefore be judged by outcomes rather than slogans. Are maritime information channels timely and trusted? Do training programmes build local capability that remains after visiting ships depart? Can partners coordinate search and rescue, counter-piracy or disaster response while respecting national jurisdiction? Are infrastructure and economic projects transparent, sustainable and financially sound? These tests align with India’s own stated principles of equality, sovereignty and lawful commerce. They also give neighbouring countries a basis for evaluating India’s role without having to endorse every element of its broader strategic posture.
SAGAR captures India’s interest in a stable Indian Ocean, but it also articulates a potential bargain: shared security should produce shared capacity and opportunity. The 2025 multinational voyage of INS Sunayna showed how a broad political idea can be made tangible through crews training and working at sea. Whether the vision earns lasting trust will depend on repeated cooperation, partner ownership and practical benefits across the region. The Indian Ocean is too interconnected for security to be supplied by one navy alone; it is also too politically diverse for any country to assume that its leadership will automatically be accepted.