Research current to 17 November 2026.
India’s Act East Policy is a long-term effort to make the country a more connected, reliable and constructive partner in Southeast Asia. Its case is not that India must choose a camp in an emerging contest for influence. It is that regular diplomacy, open trade, usable transport links and practical regional cooperation serve India’s interests while giving ASEAN countries another partner with which to shape the region’s future. The policy deserves support when its promises are judged by delivery, not by slogans.
The approach grew out of India’s Look East Policy in the early 1990s. India became an ASEAN sectoral dialogue partner in 1992; the relationship deepened to full dialogue partnership by the mid-1990s and to summit-level engagement in 2002. It became a Strategic Partnership in 2012. At the 12th ASEAN–India Summit in Nay Pyi Taw in November 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi described Look East as transformed into Act East and placed ASEAN at its centre. The partnership advanced to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022. That sequence shows continuity with a change in emphasis: from opening a diplomatic channel to building a wider, more practical relationship.
ASEAN’s central role matters. The region is made up of countries with different political systems, economic priorities and foreign-policy choices. India’s stated support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led forums recognizes that regional order cannot be built by treating Southeast Asian states as objects of competition. In the 2026–2030 ASEAN–India Plan of Action, both sides commit to work through existing channels such as the ASEAN–India Summit, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and reaffirm ASEAN’s central role in the regional architecture. Act East is strongest when it listens and delivers through these shared institutions.
Commerce gives the policy a measurable foundation. India and ASEAN already have a goods agreement, signed in 2009 and in force since 2010, followed by agreements on services and investment. Indian government figures put bilateral trade at about US$128 billion in financial year 2025–26. But scale alone does not establish that the arrangement works evenly. India’s published 2024–25 figures recorded exports of US$38.96 billion and imports of US$84.16 billion, a goods deficit of US$45.20 billion. Those figures are for a different year than the latest headline total, but they help explain why India wants clearer, more usable terms.
The ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement is therefore under review. At the 15th Joint Committee meeting in October 2026, officials directed subcommittees to expedite unresolved chapters; the next meeting was scheduled for January 2027. India can reasonably seek simpler rules, more balanced access and effective safeguards while ASEAN seeks dependable market opportunities. Until negotiations conclude, however, the review is a work in progress—not a finished answer to trade concerns. A successful update should make it easier for firms, especially smaller exporters, to use preferences and should be assessed against actual trade flows.
Physical connectivity is the other major test. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway is intended to connect India’s Northeast with Myanmar and Thailand, with an eventual eastward extension envisaged toward Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam. It could support commerce, tourism and local livelihoods, but it should not be described as a fully functioning regional corridor. The new 2026–2030 Plan of Action still calls for its early completion and operationalisation. That language is a clear reminder that announced routes and completed, dependable transport services are not the same thing. Security conditions, construction, border procedures and maintenance all affect whether people and goods can move reliably.
Maritime cooperation offers a more immediate example of practical engagement. The ASEAN–India Maritime Exercise began in 2023; its second edition took place at Subic Bay in the Philippines in September 2026, bringing Indian ships together with maritime forces from ASEAN states for coordinated training and professional exchanges. The year 2026 was also designated the ASEAN–India Year of Maritime Cooperation. These activities can build familiarity, safety practices and the ability to coordinate at sea. They do not create a mutual-defence alliance, and they need not be framed as a message against any third country. Cooperation on lawful maritime activity, disaster response and communication is valuable on its own terms.
The relationship also works through education, culture, technology and public institutions. The 2026–2030 plan includes cooperation on digital policy, capacity-building, science and technology, tourism and people-to-people contact. At the 23rd ASEAN–India Summit in Manila on 17 November 2026, India proposed a long-term maritime cooperation plan, youth exchanges, technical discussions on nuclear energy, a space hackathon, critical-minerals cooperation, additional Nalanda University scholarships and free electronic visas for ASEAN visitors. These are proposals, not completed programmes. The leaders did adopt a joint statement on disaster management, which gives officials a specific area for follow-up.
That distinction between intention and implementation is central to a fair assessment. A Plan of Action records what governments agree to pursue; it does not itself finish roads, remove non-tariff barriers or guarantee student exchanges. The unresolved AITIGA chapters and the highway’s continuing completion language show why monitoring matters. Regional trade also depends on firms knowing the rules, customs agencies applying them consistently, and infrastructure being maintained after construction. India must invest in its own Northeast’s links and capacity if the region is to benefit from the policy.
Act East should therefore be defended as a patient, practical foreign-policy choice. It expands India’s options, strengthens cooperation with ASEAN and connects India more closely to the economies and institutions of Southeast Asia without asking partners to surrender their independence. Its achievements are already visible in the upgraded partnership, active trade, recurring maritime exercises and regular diplomatic machinery. Its limits are visible too: trade remains uneven, major routes remain unfinished, and many new initiatives are still on paper.
The right standard is steady implementation. India should keep supporting ASEAN centrality, complete agreed links where feasible, make the trade agreement easier to use, and turn summit proposals into funded programmes with clear responsibilities. ASEAN partners, for their part, should have a meaningful role in setting priorities and evaluating results. If the policy produces more reliable movement, broader commercial opportunity and practical cooperation chosen by both sides, Act East will continue to strengthen India’s regional position in a way that earns trust.