← All writing

ARTICLE 50·NEIGHBOURHOOD DIPLOMACY

India–Pakistan Relations: Security, Dialogue, and the Ceasefire

Byline: Ibrahim Javaid Status date: 17 November 2026

Original editorial illustration for article 50: India–Pakistan Relations: Security, Dialogue, and the Ceasefire.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINERNeighbourhood diplomacy

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question

Byline: Ibrahim Javaid Status date: 17 November 2026

Read the article and sources
02The record

India’s approach to Pakistan must answer two duties at once: protect people from cross-border violence and keep crises from becoming wars. Firm security measures and carefully maintained communication channels serve those duties together. A ceasefire can reduce immediate danger, but it cannot settle the causes of conflict or establish trust by itself. India is justified in…

Read the article and sources
03What follows

India should therefore pair a firm security posture with disciplined crisis management. That means investigating attacks, pursuing accountability, communicating promptly through military hotlines, and using diplomatic protests and multilateral forums to manage incidents. It also means avoiding claims that outrun the public evidence and keeping decisions proportionate to the…

Read the article and sources

Byline: Ibrahim Javaid Status date: 17 November 2026

India’s approach to Pakistan must answer two duties at once: protect people from cross-border violence and keep crises from becoming wars. Firm security measures and carefully maintained communication channels serve those duties together. A ceasefire can reduce immediate danger, but it cannot settle the causes of conflict or establish trust by itself. India is justified in insisting that terrorism be addressed before a wider political process can make progress; it is also in India’s interest to preserve the military and diplomatic contacts that can prevent a future incident from spiralling.

The stakes were again made clear on 22 April 2025, when an armed attack near Pahalgam killed at least 26 people. The United Nations Security Council condemned the attack and called for those responsible, including its organizers, financiers and sponsors, to be held accountable. India said the attack had cross-border links and accused Pakistan-based actors. Pakistan rejected India’s allegations and called for an impartial investigation. The Council’s statement condemned the attack without assigning responsibility to either government. That distinction matters: the killing of civilians is established; responsibility and state involvement are matters the two governments contest.

India launched Operation Sindoor in May 2025, describing its strikes as focused on terrorist infrastructure and as a response to the Pahalgam attack. Pakistan condemned the strikes as aggression, reported civilian deaths and said it had responded in self-defence. The military confrontation included exchanges across several domains and created an immediate risk of further escalation between two nuclear-armed states. A sound assessment can support India’s responsibility to act against terrorism while recognizing that official descriptions of targets, losses and battlefield outcomes were disputed. Retaliation should remain tied to credible evidence, a defined security purpose and measures to limit civilian harm.

On 10 May, the two countries agreed to stop firing and military action. India told Parliament that Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations contacted his Indian counterpart and that the cessation was agreed directly between the two DGMOs. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry later said its Deputy Prime Minister had received a call from the United States Secretary of State before Islamabad agreed to stop the fighting. The public accounts differ over the role of outside diplomacy, while confirming that military-to-military contact formed part of the cessation. India also told Parliament that no bilateral agreement was signed after the ceasefire. It was an operational understanding to halt the immediate confrontation, not a settlement of Kashmir, terrorism allegations or other disputes.

That difference between a military truce and a political process is important. The DGMOs’ joint statement of February 2021 had already recommitted both sides to observe ceasefire arrangements along the Line of Control and other sectors. It also said the established hotline and border flag meetings would be used to resolve unforeseen situations or misunderstandings. This shows that direct contact can produce a practical security benefit even when the broader relationship remains tense. The 2025 crisis makes the same case with greater urgency: clear channels are a form of risk control, not a reward for either side.

India’s stated policy remains that it wants normal neighbourly relations and that outstanding issues should be resolved bilaterally and peacefully in an environment free from terror, violence and hostility. The Ministry of External Affairs repeated in October 2026 that India’s Pakistan policy had not changed after the Pahalgam attack. This position is defensible. A government has a duty to respond when its civilians are attacked, and repeated cross-border violence can make public confidence in dialogue difficult to sustain. India’s insistence on credible action against terrorist networks gives any eventual engagement a condition that can be assessed against evidence and conduct.

Conditions should be clear, proportionate and connected to specific risks. A policy that leaves no practical route back to communication can make restraint harder to maintain after the next incident. India can continue to demand cooperation against terrorism while keeping the DGMO hotline active, promptly clarifying allegations, and using diplomatic channels to prevent local incidents from widening. The 1991 agreement on advance notice of military exercises and movements, together with established maritime safety rules, also offers a basis for addressing operational incidents before they become political crises.

Such safeguards are relevant beyond the Line of Control. In September 2026, Indian and Pakistani naval units collided in the Arabian Sea. Pakistan said an Indian vessel had acted provocatively during a Pakistani naval exercise in Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone. India lodged a protest and described the collision as the result of unsafe conduct by the Pakistani vessel in international waters. Each side’s account assigns responsibility to the other. The incident demonstrates why governments need prompt communication, reliable procedures and restraint even when they reject the other side’s version of events.

There is a limited opening for contact through multilateral institutions. India said it invited all Shanghai Cooperation Organisation members to the Civilisational Dialogue Forum in New Delhi on 20–22 November 2026. Pakistan confirmed receipt of the invitation and, on 14 November, nominated its climate-change minister to represent it. Attendance at an SCO event does not amount to renewed bilateral negotiations, and neither government has described it as such. It does, however, keep officials in the same institutional setting and can help preserve minimum working contact while political disagreements continue.

India should therefore pair a firm security posture with disciplined crisis management. That means investigating attacks, pursuing accountability, communicating promptly through military hotlines, and using diplomatic protests and multilateral forums to manage incidents. It also means avoiding claims that outrun the public evidence and keeping decisions proportionate to the threat. A ceasefire is most valuable when it protects civilians, reduces the chance of miscalculation and keeps room open for later diplomacy. India can defend its decisions and its citizens while building those practical safeguards; both are necessary to make deterrence credible and peace more attainable.

Sources