Ibrahim Javaid
Status assessed as of 17 November 2026.
India–Bhutan hydropower cooperation is often described as a model of regional partnership. Its record supports that description, but the arrangement is more than a friendship slogan: it rests on project agreements, public financing, electricity purchase arrangements and shared grid infrastructure. The results have helped Bhutan build power generation and export earnings while giving India a nearby source of renewable electricity. The partnership also exposes Bhutan to debt, construction and environmental risks, so its value depends on how well those risks are managed.
The two countries’ 1949 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, renewed in 2007, supplies the wider diplomatic context. The sectoral rules come from later instruments: the 2006 bilateral agreement on hydropower cooperation, its 2009 protocol, and a 2014 intergovernmental agreement that created a framework for joint-venture projects. These arrangements have supported two main ways of developing projects. Under the intergovernmental model, the governments finance and oversee a project through a joint authority; under the joint-venture model, Bhutan’s Druk Green Power Corporation (DGPC) partners with an Indian company, with project ownership and operating terms set out in the venture’s agreements. They are not one uniform contract, and grants, loans, tariffs and risks differ by project.
The financing can combine assistance with commercial obligations. For example, Punatsangchhu-II’s original 2010 agreement sanctioned a base cost of Nu./₹37,778 million at March 2009 prices and set funding at 30 percent grant and 70 percent loan, with the loan carrying 10 percent annual interest and repayment in 30 semi-annual instalments beginning one year after the mean date of operation. That is the original sanctioned financing formula, not a statement of the project’s eventual outturn cost after years of delays and revisions. Punatsangchhu-I’s 2007 agreement separately specified 40 percent grant and 60 percent loan, with a 10 percent rate and 12 annual instalments. In November 2025, India also announced a concessional ₹40 billion line of credit for Bhutan energy projects; it is a broader financing facility, not a grant for one named plant.
Bhutan’s return is power for its homes and businesses, royalties and export revenue. Its National Energy Policy 2025 says rising domestic demand and seasonal flows have led it to import electricity from India during dry winter periods since 2022. In other words, exports are not a permanent surplus: run-of-river output rises and falls with river flows, and Bhutan must balance export income against domestic supply. India has supported that balance by allowing Bhutan to draw power from the Indian grid in lean periods; the Indian government reported allowing 400 MW of exports to Bhutan in January–March 2022. The same interconnection lets India receive Bhutanese surplus electricity when available, adding renewable generation to a large regional grid and strengthening cross-border trade.
Project status matters. The four older India-assisted plants—Chhukha (336 MW), Kurichhu (60 MW), Tala (1,020 MW) and Mangdechhu (720 MW)—were already operating, totalling 2,136 MW, in India’s March 2024 bilateral brief. Punatsangchhu-II (1,020 MW) is now also operating: it began exporting surplus power to India on 19 September 2025, was jointly inaugurated on 11 November 2025, and received a bilateral export-tariff protocol in April 2026. The April announcement says the starting tariff was mutually agreed but does not publish its amount. Bhutan’s electricity regulator separately listed a proposed domestic-generation tariff of Nu. 4.28 per kWh for Punatsangchhu-II for 2025–28; that is a domestic tariff proposal, not the export rate.
Punatsangchhu-I (1,200 MW) remains under construction, not in operation. Its dam works resumed in April 2026 after a long halt caused by difficult geology and slope instability. The project authority’s 31 October 2026 progress report put the dam package at 70.7 percent, while the headrace tunnel, underground powerhouse complex and transmission line were listed as complete and electro-mechanical works at 98.67 percent. The dam is the remaining critical path; the report gave no current commissioning date. The 600 MW Khorlochhu joint venture with Tata Power has construction packages underway, with an official schedule of 2025–31. The 570 MW Wangchhu project under DGPC–Adani is at the early-works stage: access-road construction and diversion works have been contracted, but it is not generating. A shareholders’ agreement for the 920 MW Punatsangchhu-III was signed in August 2026, and its detailed project report is being prepared; it is in development, not construction. DGPC and Adani also signed an October 2026 shareholders’ agreement for the 770 MW Chamkharchhu-I, a proposed project whose construction is expected to begin in the first half of 2027. These pipelines show the partnership expanding through Indian private investment, but none of these four projects is operating.
The commercial and fiscal test is not trivial. Bhutan’s FY2026–27 budget reports that, as of 31 March 2026, hydropower-related liabilities made up 58.3 percent of external debt, equivalent to 49.2 percent of GDP. That does not by itself show that the debt is unsustainable: a completed plant can produce electricity and revenue over decades. It does show why costs, interest, repayment schedules, export prices and completion dates need clear scrutiny. Geological problems delayed Punatsangchhu-I far beyond its original 2008–2015 construction timetable, tying up capital while it generated no electricity. Punatsangchhu-II also suffered delays and cost revisions; its eventual exports create value, but cannot erase the opportunity cost of the years spent waiting.
Environmental review and local participation are part of whether new capacity is genuinely beneficial. Run-of-river designs avoid some impacts associated with large reservoirs, but dams, tunnels, access roads and construction sites can still affect river flows, sediment, fish habitat, slopes, land use and livelihoods. Bhutan’s environmental clearance rules require public consultation, records of community concerns and access to assessment documents. In the proposed 1,125 MW Dorjilung project’s official ESIA summary, 92 consultations involved about 1,578 participants; the report recorded concerns over land compensation, water sources, construction impacts, social welfare and local employment. Those views should shape mitigation, benefit-sharing and project decisions rather than serve only as a procedural checkbox.
For India, the partnership supports clean-energy imports, grid links and a stable neighbour; for Bhutan, it has delivered major infrastructure, export income and technical capacity. The sound case for continuing cooperation is therefore practical: publish project costs and tariff terms, share construction and geological risks transparently, protect Bhutan’s winter supply, and make environmental review and local feedback consequential. Hydropower can deepen India–Bhutan interdependence, but its durability depends on both countries treating costs and impacts as seriously as the power it produces.