Updated 17 November 2026
Nepal’s rivers can support a larger electricity system than the country can use at every moment of the year. Turning that seasonal potential into reliable power, export earnings and affordable domestic supply requires generation, transmission and buyers to develop together. India is central to that effort: it is Nepal’s largest neighbouring electricity market and the indispensable transit route for sales to Bangladesh. Long-term trade and a stronger shared grid can serve both countries, provided the partnership respects Nepal’s choices and distributes its gains fairly.
A target, and the results already recorded
The two governments signed a Long-Term Power Trade Agreement on 4 January 2024. Nepal’s Ministry of Energy describes its aim as working toward exports of up to 10,000 megawatts to India within ten years. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) likewise presents 10,000 MW as the agreement’s ten-year objective. It is a goal for future export capacity, not the amount Nepal currently generates, an assured quantity India must purchase in every hour, or a report of power already delivered.
The latest full-year figures show progress at a different scale. Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) reported 4,120 MW of installed generation capacity at the end of fiscal year 2025/26, including 529 MW commissioned that year. It recorded 3,965 gigawatt-hours of exports to India and net exports of 2,794 GWh, with peak system demand of 3,226 MW. These are measures of installed capacity, annual energy and peak demand, not the 10,000 MW target. NEA reported NRs 29.3 billion in export revenue, up 68 percent from the previous year, demonstrating the value of market access while reflecting seasonal generation, prices and transmission availability.
Trade is already two-way. Nepal’s 2025/26 report says imports from India accounted for 6 percent of the energy available that year. Earlier, Nepal’s government energy roadmap described imports during dry-season months and exports of wet-season surplus. Floods in Nepal later damaged hydropower infrastructure. In September 2026, India’s Ministry of Power approved supply to NEA for up to 600 MW over the Muzaffarpur–Dhalkebar 400 kV line and up to 54 MW over the Tanakpur–Mahendranagar 132 kV line, for 18 hours daily through 31 December. This is a time-limited approval, with the amount for January 2027 to be reviewed; it is not evidence of a permanent one-way arrangement. Reliable interconnection has value precisely because the balance can change with season, weather and demand.
Building a regional grid
The 2022 India–Nepal Joint Vision sets five pillars: generation projects in Nepal, cross-border transmission, two-way trade, grid coordination and technical cooperation. It ties market access to mutual benefit, demand and domestic regulations. Cooperation with Bangladesh and Bhutan under the BBIN framework requires terms agreed by all participating countries. The framework advances integration while preserving each state’s policy authority.
Some essential links are already operating. Nepal’s 2024 energy roadmap identifies the 400 kV Dhalkebar–Muzaffarpur connection and the 132 kV Kataiya–Kusaha and Raxaul–Parwanipur lines as completed and in service. The same roadmap says the January 2024 export approvals covered 941 MW of projects then cleared for Indian exchange markets; that figure is a dated approval measure, not current installed capacity or proof that all approved electricity was exported. India’s 2024 annual report separately records the inauguration of three 132 kV cross-border lines and the first trilateral power transaction from Nepal to Bangladesh through the Indian grid in November 2024.
The next corridors remain future infrastructure. In October 2025, POWERGRID and NEA signed agreements to establish joint ventures for the proposed 400 kV Inaruwa–New Purnea and Lamki (Dododhara)–Bareilly double-circuit links. India’s Ministry of Power says they will increase electricity exchange once completed. Signing the joint-venture agreements is an important implementation step, but it does not mean these new lines have been built or commissioned. Keeping that distinction clear helps the public judge whether announced cooperation is translating into actual capacity.
For India, stronger ties add a nearby renewable source, widen options for balancing demand and support a more connected South Asian market. For Nepal, predictable access to India’s large market can help make hydropower and transmission investments viable and turn surplus power into export earnings. The 40 MW Nepal–Bangladesh transaction shows how India’s grid can connect Nepalese producers to a third-country customer. These gains depend on transparent rules and dependable approvals.
Cooperation must earn public confidence
Nepal should retain the lead in choosing which rivers and projects to develop, the terms on which electricity is sold, and how much generation is reserved for domestic needs. Cross-border trade should strengthen Nepal’s energy security, not make its supply plan dependent on a single market or leave households and industry paying more for power they need. NEA reported that domestic consumption rose 9 percent in 2025/26 and that 18 local levels still lacked grid connection. Domestic electrification, reliable service and productive uses of electricity therefore belong beside exports in any measure of success.
Large hydropower and transmission works carry environmental and social costs. The Energy Ministry’s roadmap notes delays and added costs linked to environmental studies, forest use and land acquisition, as well as financing and implementation challenges. Assessment of river ecology, sediment, landslides and flood risk; consultation with affected communities; fair compensation; and public reporting of local benefits should shape decisions before construction. These steps protect residents and help prevent delays, damage and mistrust.
Financing requires care. Generation and grid links demand large, long-lived investments. Nepal’s roadmap identifies limited domestic capital and a need for outside and climate finance, while NEA reports significant foreign-exchange losses on loans. These losses are not assigned to one project, but underline why contracts should disclose who bears currency, construction and demand risks. Competitive procurement, clear power-purchase terms, realistic schedules and benefit-sharing can attract investment without opaque liabilities for Nepali consumers or public finances.
India should continue to support predictable market access, emergency exchanges and jointly planned transmission, while ensuring approvals and project selection are transparent. Nepal’s 10,000 MW objective can provide direction if progress is measured against commissioned plants and lines, actual electricity traded, export receipts, domestic reliability and local outcomes. Cooperation built on those measures can make Nepal a stronger energy producer and India a more connected regional partner. Shared prosperity will come from infrastructure that works, trade that is fair, and decisions that both neighbours can defend to their citizens.