Ibrahim Javaid
As of 17 November 2026
Multilateral counter-terrorism diplomacy operates at the difficult intersection of international law, sovereign security, and great-power competition. For decades, India has sought to anchor its response to cross-border terrorism within the normative framework of the United Nations. By engaging global bodies, New Delhi has endeavoured to universalize the legal definition of terrorism, institute binding obligations on states to deny safe havens, and establish targeted sanctions against violent groups and their sponsors. This strategy reflects a deliberate choice: to translate acute national security challenges into multilateral legal norms, creating reputational, financial, and political costs for states that sponsor or harbor militant networks.
The foundation of India’s multilateral counter-terror diplomacy rests on the principle that terrorism represents an assault on global order that no state can address through unilateral measures alone. In 1996, India formally introduced the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN General Assembly under document A/C.6/51/6. The draft treaty was designed to close the gaps left by sectoral conventions then in force—which addressed specific acts such as aircraft hijacking—by creating a unified, legally binding framework. The CCIT proposed a universal definition of terrorism, affirmed that no political or religious considerations could justify terrorist acts, and codified aut dedere aut judicare—obligating member states to either prosecute perpetrators or extradite them to stand trial.
Despite sustained Indian advocacy, the CCIT has remained deadlocked within the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee (Legal). The stalemate stems from fundamental disagreements among member states regarding the definition of terrorism. A coalition of states, notably within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), has insisted on distinguishing between terrorism and the armed struggles of peoples fighting for self-determination against foreign occupation. Conversely, several Western states have expressed concern regarding whether conventional activities of state armed forces during armed conflict should be governed by international humanitarian law rather than an anti-terrorism treaty.
India’s official position has consistently maintained that terror cannot be justified by any cause, warning that political carve-outs create legal ambiguities that violent groups exploit. While the deadlock illustrates the severe limits of multilateral consensus when core definitions diverge, the CCIT has nevertheless served as a normative benchmark, focusing diplomatic pressure on states that offer safe harbour to proscribed outfits.
Complementing its efforts in the General Assembly, India has focused diplomatic energy on the United Nations Security Council, particularly the 1267 Al-Qaida and ISIL (Da'esh) Sanctions Committee. Established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999)), this body maintains targeted financial freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes against designated individuals and entities. India has leveraged this mechanism to seek multilateral listings for leaders and front organizations of Pakistan-based militant groups responsible for attacks on Indian soil, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).
This process has frequently encountered great-power obstruction. For nearly a decade, China—exercising its prerogative as a permanent member of the Security Council—placed repeated technical holds on proposals to designate Jaish-e-Mohammed founder Masood Azhar. India pursued persistent engagement with Council members, eventually securing the listing of Azhar in May 2019 under Security Council Press Release SC/13799 following the Pulwama attack. Similar persistence resulted in the listing of Lashkar-e-Taiba deputy chief Abdul Rehman Makki in January 2023 under Security Council Press Release SC/15174. While targeted UN sanctions do not automatically dismantle militant camps, they impose verifiable legal requirements on UN member states to freeze financial assets, restrict travel, and curtail operational legitimacy.
During its 2021–2022 tenure as an elected member of the Security Council, India intensified its institutional counter-terrorism diplomacy. In January 2021, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar presented an eight-point action plan at the UNSC, commemorating the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1373. The proposal called for an end to double standards, demanding that the Council resist differentiating between "good" and "bad" terrorists, reform the working methods of sanctions committees to end unjustified procedural holds, and address the nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime.
In October 2022, as Chair of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, India hosted a special meeting in Mumbai and New Delhi on emerging technologies. The session produced the Delhi Declaration, adopted as UN document S/2022/806. The declaration established multilateral guidelines to tackle the misuse of unmanned aerial systems (drones) for cross-border arms drops, encrypted digital platforms for recruitment, and virtual assets for illicit financing.
The case for India’s counter-terror diplomacy is grounded in its capacity to construct an enduring international legal regime that constrains adversary behavior and reduces room for plausible deniability. Connecting multilateral designations to mechanisms like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has created tangible economic incentives for compliance, pressing states that harbor militant networks to enact domestic asset freezes and counter-financing legislation.
Yet this policy carries distinct tradeoffs and limitations. Multilateral diplomacy is inherently slow, frequently hostage to great-power vetoes, and reliant on consensus that dilutes enforcement. Critics, particularly in Islamabad, contend that India uses UN counter-terrorism platforms to pursue narrow bilateral grievances and deflect international scrutiny from conditions in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has regularly submitted dossiers to the UN alleging Indian covert interference in its territory—claims that the Indian government rejects as baseless. Furthermore, persistent legal stalemates over the CCIT risk creating diplomatic cynicism, consuming significant capital without yielding a binding global convention.
These counterarguments underscore the limits of multilateralism, but they do not diminish the value of India’s diplomatic engagement. In the absence of sustained Indian advocacy at the United Nations, state-sponsored cross-border militancy would risk being treated as a localized dispute rather than a breach of international obligations. By anchoring counter-terrorism within binding Security Council mandates and multilateral norm-building, India has established an indispensable layer of diplomatic deterrence that complements its national defence posture.