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ARTICLE 34·DEFENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS

India’s Defence Exports and the Growth of Strategic Partnerships

Current through 17 November 2026

Original editorial illustration for article 34: India’s Defence Exports and the Growth of Strategic Partnerships.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINERDefence and constitutional decisions

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question

Current through 17 November 2026

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02The record

India’s defence exports are best understood as part of a wider effort to strengthen domestic industry and build practical partnerships abroad. An export order can support production lines, technical skills and long-term maintenance relationships. It can also give a partner another source of equipment. Those benefits are real possibilities, not automatic outcomes: a contract…

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03What follows

The supportive case for India’s export policy is strongest when it is made carefully. Higher exports can deepen industrial capacity and give partners more choices, while Indian defence diplomacy can build on existing agreements and shared interests. Neither result is guaranteed by a rising headline figure. The government’s export target of ₹50,000 crore by 2029 is an…

Read the article and sources

Current through 17 November 2026

India’s defence exports are best understood as part of a wider effort to strengthen domestic industry and build practical partnerships abroad. An export order can support production lines, technical skills and long-term maintenance relationships. It can also give a partner another source of equipment. Those benefits are real possibilities, not automatic outcomes: a contract does not prove a system has been delivered, that it has performed as intended, or that a buyer’s foreign policy will align with India’s.

The latest Ministry of Defence figures show a sharp expansion. India recorded defence exports of ₹38,424 crore in financial year 2025–26, up ₹14,802 crore, or 62.66 per cent, from ₹23,622 crore in 2024–25. The Ministry reported that defence public sector undertakings accounted for 54.84 per cent of the 2025–26 total and private firms 45.16 per cent. These are reported export values, not a measure of profits, combat effectiveness or domestic content in every exported product. They do, however, show that defence sales abroad have become a substantial industrial activity. Ministry of Defence, 2 April 2026

The preceding year’s data illustrate the breadth of the supplier base. In 2024–25, private firms accounted for ₹15,233 crore of exports and defence public sector undertakings for ₹8,389 crore. The Department of Defence Production issued 1,762 export authorisations that year, compared with 1,507 in 2023–24. The Ministry also said Indian companies supplied ammunition, arms, systems, subsystems and components to around 80 countries. Authorisations are permissions to export; they are not a count of shipments or proof that every approved sale was completed. That distinction matters when measuring the sector’s reach. Ministry of Defence, 1 April 2025

For India, a larger export base can help keep production and engineering capabilities viable between domestic orders. A broader customer base may also create recurring work in training, spares and maintenance. These are strategic arguments for exports, but they depend on reliable delivery, product quality and sustained support. They should not be confused with proof that export growth alone has made India self-reliant. The Defence Ministry’s figures do not establish how much of each exported item was designed or manufactured wholly in India, or how much depends on imported engines, electronics, materials or other components.

Exports can also support relationships where defence cooperation is already developing. The Philippines provides a documented example. In January 2022, BrahMos Aerospace signed a contract with the Philippine Department of National Defence for a shore-based anti-ship missile system. India’s Ministry of External Affairs describes defence engagement with the Philippines as a component of a broader relationship, including a 2006 defence-cooperation memorandum and later mechanisms for defence industry and logistics cooperation. The transaction therefore sits within an institutional partnership; it is not evidence that one sale has changed the regional balance by itself. Ministry of Defence announcement, MEA India–Philippines brief

This example also shows why “indigenous” and “international” are not opposites. BrahMos is a joint venture between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya. Indian exports can emerge from cooperative research, technology and manufacturing arrangements. Such partnerships can widen India’s industrial options, while also leaving questions about intellectual property, access to components and the ability to sustain production if a foreign partner or supply route becomes unavailable. Ministry of Defence background on BrahMos

There is a serious case for caution. Arms transfers can intensify regional competition, create dependencies for the buyer, or expose sensitive technology to diversion. They can also impose reputational costs if equipment is used in ways that violate law or harm civilians. Export policy therefore has to balance commercial ambitions with national security, end-use scrutiny and India’s stated interest in being a responsible supplier. Oversight must extend beyond approving a sale: the exporter and state need to assess the recipient, the item, its proposed use, re-export risks and the practical ability to monitor compliance.

Domestic readiness should remain the anchor of this policy. Export orders may provide manufacturers with longer production runs and additional experience, but the same factories, engineers and suppliers also support India’s own forces. A government should therefore weigh delivery schedules and capacity constraints against prospective export revenue. This is a strategic judgment, not something the export total can answer. Public export figures do not show whether a particular contract improved a production line, reduced the cost of domestic equipment, or competed with a domestic delivery. A durable policy measures success through both external sales and reliable support for India’s services.

India’s system includes formal authorisation. The Department of Defence Production’s published mandate says it licenses exports of Category 6 munitions-list items under SCOMET and handles end-user certificates under powers delegated by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The official trade handbook requires export authorisation for controlled SCOMET items and sets out documentation, including end-user certificates, for applications. These procedures show that defence exports are regulated transactions, not an unrestricted extension of ordinary trade. The existence of controls is not, by itself, evidence that every risk has been prevented; implementation and case-by-case decisions remain important. Department of Defence Production mandate, DGFT SCOMET procedures

The supportive case for India’s export policy is strongest when it is made carefully. Higher exports can deepen industrial capacity and give partners more choices, while Indian defence diplomacy can build on existing agreements and shared interests. Neither result is guaranteed by a rising headline figure. The government’s export target of ₹50,000 crore by 2029 is an aspiration, not an achieved result. Meeting it responsibly should mean more than adding customers: India will need dependable products, transparent licensing, credible end-use safeguards and the ability to provide support over a system’s full service life. That combination can strengthen India’s strategic partnerships without overstating what export numbers alone prove.

Sources