Ibrahim Javaid
Defence procurement is often discussed as a contest between buying abroad and making at home. India’s real task is more precise: build domestic capacity where it improves readiness and control, while drawing on foreign partners when they can supply a capability India needs sooner or cannot yet produce at the required scale. Diversification is not a search for a different flag on every contract. It is a way to reduce the chance that a single supplier, production line, technology or political disruption can weaken the armed forces’ ability to operate.
The Government of India’s stated procurement approach already recognizes this balance. In a parliamentary reply, the Ministry of Defence said that capital equipment is acquired from domestic and foreign vendors according to threat perceptions, operational challenges and technological change. The same reply explained that the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP) gives the highest preference to the Buy Indian–Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured category. It says purchases under Buy Global are allowed only in exceptional situations with specific approval by the Defence Acquisition Council or the Raksha Mantri. This framework makes self-reliance a direction of travel while keeping operational need at the centre.
That distinction matters because the cost of a defence system is not limited to its purchase price. Aircraft, ships, missiles, radars and communications systems may remain in service for decades. Their availability depends on spare parts, maintenance facilities, software updates, ammunition, trained technicians and access to design information. If a foreign supplier faces export controls, a production backlog or a crisis that raises its own military needs, deliveries can slow. If India depends too heavily on one source for a critical component, a disruption can affect several platforms at once. These are general risks of concentrated supply chains; their scale varies by system and cannot be inferred from a headline procurement figure alone.
Domestic production can reduce some of those vulnerabilities. Indian manufacturers and research institutions can build maintenance expertise, adapt equipment to local conditions and respond to requirements without waiting for every change to be approved overseas. Local manufacturing also gives India more options when it needs to replenish stocks or repair equipment. Yet a product assembled in India is not automatically independent of foreign technology. Engines, sensors, semiconductors, specialised materials or software may still come from abroad. A sensible diversification plan therefore asks where control over design, repair and replenishment is strategically important, not only where the final assembly takes place.
The government’s industrial policy uses several routes to expand that capability. Besides giving preference to Indian-designed systems, DAP 2020 allows procurement models that combine Indian production with foreign technology transfer, including Buy and Make and Buy Global–Manufacture in India. The Ministry also describes a Strategic Partnership model in which Indian firms may work with global manufacturers to establish domestic facilities and supply chains. Its official policy summary describes local production, imported-spares indigenisation and technology transfer as parts of the approach. These mechanisms can turn an urgent purchase into a longer-term industrial relationship, although technology transfer is negotiated case by case and should never be assumed to include every design right or component.
Recent contract data show the scale of the domestic shift, while also illustrating why figures need context. The Ministry reported that in financial year 2024–25 it signed 193 defence contracts worth ₹2,09,050 crore. Of these, 177 contracts worth ₹1,68,922 crore went to domestic industry—about 81 per cent of the reported contract value. The figures are recorded in the Ministry’s account of defence contracts. They show that Indian suppliers are receiving a larger role in procurement. They do not show how much equipment has already been delivered, whether all components are made in India, or how available the systems will be over their service lives. Those questions need separate reporting.
The SRIJAN portal, which lists imported components for potential domestic manufacture, and Positive Indigenisation Lists, which set deadlines after which specified items are no longer to be imported, give firms a clearer path to replace selected imports. The Ministry’s official defence-sector overview also describes support for defence research, start-ups and small businesses. Such measures are most useful when requirements are technically clear, orders are predictable and Indian suppliers can meet military standards. Import substitution should be tested through reliability and lifecycle cost, not counted as a success merely because a source has changed.
Foreign procurement still has a legitimate role. If a capability is urgent and no domestic design can meet the operational requirement on time, insisting on local production alone may leave a gap. Foreign systems can also bring access to specialised technology, joint development and interoperability with partners. The government’s own policy recognizes the need to consider domestic and foreign vendors. The strategic objective should be to use international partnerships without allowing one relationship to become indispensable. Where possible, India can negotiate local maintenance, joint production, training, assured spare supplies and a path to develop alternatives. These provisions make cooperation more durable for both sides.
Diversification has costs too. Operating several types of aircraft, guns or communications equipment can multiply training, repair and inventory requirements. Switching suppliers may require new infrastructure and years of testing. Local development can also take longer than expected, and a protected market with too little competition can weaken cost discipline. Policymakers should therefore compare readiness, delivery schedules, reliability, lifecycle costs and access to technology—not just the country of origin. A second supplier is useful only if it can actually provide compatible equipment or parts when needed.
The Ministry’s February 2026 notice on the draft DAP 2026 proposed that it would replace DAP 2020 once approved and that imports would be limited to critical equipment unavailable domestically. Because the notice described a draft, its proposals should be distinguished from rules already in force. The separate Defence Procurement Manual 2025 concerns revenue procurement and the maintenance and sustainment of equipment, while DAP governs capital acquisitions. Both stages matter: a new platform that cannot be maintained is not a dependable capability.
India’s strongest position is to build an industrial base that expands its choices. Domestic design and repair capacity can reduce exposure to external shocks; diversified foreign ties can bring capabilities and knowledge that are not yet available locally. Neither policy should be treated as an end in itself. Success is measured by whether the armed forces receive reliable equipment on time, whether supply chains have credible alternatives, and whether public money strengthens Indian expertise without sacrificing immediate security. That is the case for diversification: it protects India’s freedom to choose and gives self-reliance a practical meaning.
### Sources
- Ministry of Defence, “Import in Defence Sector”, 10 February 2023.
- Ministry of Defence, “New Procurement Policy”, 4 April 2022.
- Ministry of Defence, “Production of Defence Equipment in ‘Make-in-India’ Programme”, 19 July 2021.
- Ministry of Defence, “Defence Acquisitions: Accelerating Self-Reliance”, contract data for FY 2024–25.
- Ministry of Defence, “Inviting Comments on the Draft Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP)–2026”, 10 February 2026.
- Ministry of Defence, “Raksha Mantri approves Defence Procurement Manual 2025”, 14 September 2025.