Ibrahim Javaid
India’s defence manufacturing push is often described as a choice between self-reliance and imports. The strategic question is more practical: which capabilities must India be able to design, make, repair and replenish at home, and where can foreign partnerships still provide value? A country facing long procurement cycles and uncertain international supply chains benefits from a stronger industrial base. But domestic production is a means to military readiness, not a measure of it by itself.
The case for building at home begins with supply security. Foreign suppliers may face export controls, production backlogs, sanctions, shipping disruptions or pressure to serve their own armed forces first. In a crisis, the ability to source spares, ammunition and maintenance locally can preserve operational tempo. Domestic design authority can also help the services update equipment as threats change. This does not require every component to be Indian; it requires identifying vulnerable dependencies and developing alternatives where reliability and strategic control matter most.
Recent official figures show that the industrial base has expanded. The Ministry of Defence reported defence production of ₹1.78 lakh crore in FY 2025–26, up 15.6% from ₹1.54 lakh crore in FY 2024–25. Public-sector entities accounted for about 76% of the latest total, while private companies contributed 24%. These are production values, not the value of new contracts, not a count of equipment delivered to the armed forces, and not proof that every platform’s components or intellectual property are domestic. They indicate a larger manufacturing ecosystem, while leaving important questions about quality, delivery and indigenous value added.
The procurement system is one lever for turning that capacity into capability. Under the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, “Buy (Indian-IDDM)”—Indian designed, developed and manufactured—is placed first in the stated preference order for acquisition categories. That preference is conditional: the armed forces still need equipment that meets technical requirements, can be supplied in the required quantity and arrives on a useful timetable. For FY 2026–27, the Ministry of Defence says ₹1.39 lakh crore, or 75% of the capital acquisition budget, is earmarked for domestic industry. An earmark is a budget decision, not a completed purchase or delivery; the public interest depends on what is contracted, paid for, tested and fielded.
Policy statements should also be read with care. The Ministry’s DPEPP 2020 document is explicitly a draft that set out ambitions for production, exports, research and Indian intellectual property. Such goals can signal direction to firms, but they are not evidence that a capability has been built or a target met.
Domestic sourcing can create skilled work beyond the final assembly line. Defence production draws on electronics, precision engineering, software, metallurgy, shipbuilding, testing and maintenance. Small suppliers can gain work when major manufacturers disclose requirements early, certify vendors fairly and pay on predictable schedules. The Ministry’s latest annual report records 676 start-ups and MSMEs engaged through iDEX by March 2026, with 551 development contracts; it also reports that only 48 resulting procurement contracts, worth ₹2,657 crore, had been signed. That distinction matters: a prototype-development agreement creates an opportunity, while a production order signals a further step toward a usable product. Employment gains are plausible, but output totals alone do not reveal how many durable jobs were created or where.
Exports can reinforce scale. India’s reported defence exports reached ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025–26, compared with ₹23,622 crore the year before. The Ministry says products went to more than 80 countries and 145 Indian exporters were active that year. Export sales can give manufacturers a broader market, sustain production runs and deepen maintenance and training links with partner countries. They may also support India’s diplomacy by offering partners an additional supplier. Yet export totals should not be confused with export authorisations, and a one-year surge does not guarantee repeat orders, dependable after-sales service or a lasting market share. Export decisions also need careful end-use review and must account for regional security and India’s diplomatic interests.
The limits are just as strategic. The Ministry’s annual report says higher-capacity marine diesel engines had largely come from foreign original equipment makers, while a domestic development project is under way. It also notes that specialised HY-80 and HY-100 steels for submarine construction are being indigenised even as the grades continue to be imported from France. A product made in India may still depend on imported engines, chips, sensors, materials or design rights. Supply security therefore requires mapping the full chain, not counting only the location where a system is assembled. Partnerships and selective imports remain important when they provide advanced technology or close an urgent capability gap; the policy goal should be to absorb knowledge and reduce critical dependence over time, rather than to reject useful foreign equipment as a matter of slogan.
There are also real costs. Indigenous development may require years of trials, redesign and certification. If procurement is delayed or requirements keep changing, domestic firms may struggle to invest and the armed forces may wait too long for equipment. Protection from imports can weaken price discipline if competition is thin. Conversely, short-term reliance on a single overseas supplier can create lock-in and limit upgrades. Fair competition among public companies, private firms, start-ups and foreign partners operating in India, alongside transparent evaluation and independent quality checks, helps balance these risks. Parliament and the public should be able to distinguish announced investment commitments from money actually invested, contracts signed from equipment accepted, and production figures from delivery schedules.
Atmanirbhar Bharat is strongest when it means the capacity to choose: to sustain essential equipment at home, build Indian design and repair skills, and cooperate internationally from a more secure position. India’s rising production and export figures are encouraging measures of industrial growth, not a verdict that import dependence has ended or that every domestic programme is cost-effective. The test is whether the armed forces receive reliable equipment on time, whether Indian firms can compete on quality and lifecycle cost, and whether critical technologies become easier to maintain and improve. Self-reliance should be judged by that resilience—and by the transparency with which public money is converted into capability.
### Sources
- Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2025–26, Department of Defence Production, pp. 62, 139–140, 144 and 155.
- Ministry of Defence, “Defence production soars to a record Rs 1.78 lakh crore in Financial Year 2025–26”, 17 June 2026.
- Ministry of Defence, “Defence exports skyrocket to record Rs 38,424 crore in Financial Year 2025–26”, 2 April 2026.
- Ministry of Defence, Union Budget 2026–27 allocation and domestic procurement earmark, 1 February 2026; Government of India, Notes on Demands for Grants, 2026–27.
- Ministry of Defence, Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, amended 13 April 2022.
- Ministry of Defence, Draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP) 2020, posted 3 August 2020.