← All writing

ARTICLE 29·STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND MAJOR-POWER RELATIONS

India–China Competition and the Need for Firm Diplomacy

Ibrahim Javaid

Original editorial illustration for article 29: India–China Competition and the Need for Firm Diplomacy.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINERStrategic autonomy and major-power relations

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question
02The record

India’s relationship with China is shaped by an unresolved boundary, strategic competition and deep economic links. Treating it only as a military rivalry misses the leverage and exposure created by trade; treating commerce as proof of political trust ignores the risks of an unsettled border. India needs a policy that is firm in its interests and disciplined in its methods…

Read the article and sources
03What follows

India’s strongest course is patient and clear-eyed: keep the border secure, insist that commitments be honoured, invest in resilience, and preserve channels that can manage disagreement. Firm diplomacy neither assumes goodwill nor rules out cooperation. It judges progress by conduct, reciprocity and results—and gives India room to compete without making conflict the measure…

Read the article and sources

Ibrahim Javaid

India’s relationship with China is shaped by an unresolved boundary, strategic competition and deep economic links. Treating it only as a military rivalry misses the leverage and exposure created by trade; treating commerce as proof of political trust ignores the risks of an unsettled border. India needs a policy that is firm in its interests and disciplined in its methods: sustain dialogue, keep border areas prepared, reduce avoidable economic vulnerabilities and cooperate where shared interests produce practical gains.

“Firm” should mean clear principles backed by consistent action, not permanent hostility. India’s stated position is that peace and tranquillity on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are essential to wider relations, and that existing agreements must be observed. In a February 2025 parliamentary answer, the Ministry of External Affairs said the October 2024 patrolling arrangement for Depsang and Demchok led to disengagement from the 2020 friction points, with patrols and, where applicable, grazing to resume under longstanding practice. The same answer stressed that prior disengagement terms continue in other relevant areas. These are important steps, but they are not a final boundary settlement; implementation and communication still matter. MEA’s parliamentary answer

Dialogue is therefore a tool of statecraft, not a concession. At the 35th Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs (WMCC) meeting in May 2026, the two delegations reviewed the border situation, discussed management and delimitation, and agreed to prepare for another meeting of Special Representatives. India also called for an early meeting of the expert mechanism on trans-border rivers. The Indian Embassy’s readout said both sides expressed satisfaction with progress in maintaining peace and tranquillity. That official assessment is not evidence that every dispute is resolved; it shows why regular military and diplomatic channels should stay active. Embassy of India in Beijing: 35th WMCC meeting

Readiness gives diplomacy credibility and protects people who live in remote border districts. The Border Roads Organisation reported that it completed about 769 kilometres of road construction in forward areas in financial year 2024–25, while its 2025–26 expenditure target was ₹17,900 crore. Such infrastructure serves civilian access, emergency response and logistical reliability as well as defence. It is reasonable to support reliable roads, bridges, communications and supplies in difficult terrain; this does not require portraying every project as a signal of imminent conflict. Resilient infrastructure also depends on maintenance, environmental care and consultation with local communities. PIB on BRO’s work and allocations

Economic exposure calls for similarly measured policy. A Ministry of Commerce answer reporting DGCI&S data gives imports from China of US$113.45 billion and exports of US$14.25 billion in 2024–25, a goods-trade gap of roughly US$99.2 billion by subtraction. More recent Department of Commerce quick estimates put April–October 2026–27 imports at US$96.6 billion and exports at about US$10.1 billion; the tables mark October figures provisional. The export estimate rose 36.1 per cent year on year, while imports rose 30.6 per cent. Growth in exports is encouraging, but the gap and the scale of imports remain substantial. Commerce Ministry’s trade answer and quick estimates for October 2026

The case for reducing risk is not an argument for abruptly cutting trade. The Commerce Ministry notes that many imports from China are capital goods, intermediate inputs and raw materials—including active pharmaceutical ingredients, auto components and electronic parts—used by Indian industries, including some exporters. Replacing them overnight could raise costs, slow production and weaken India’s competitiveness. The practical goal should be diversification where viable, competitive domestic capacity, alternative suppliers for critical inputs, transparent investment and procurement review in sensitive sectors, and better visibility into supply chains. These steps lower vulnerability over time without treating ordinary trade as a security threat. The Prime Minister’s September 2026 meeting with President Xi, according to India’s official account, explicitly recognised the structural trade imbalance and supply-chain issues as matters to address. Commerce Ministry answer; PM India readout, 12 September 2026

There are real costs on both sides of a firm approach. Excessive restrictions can burden manufacturers and consumers; an unnecessarily confrontational tone can close channels that help prevent incidents. Conversely, prolonged high-altitude deployments consume resources and leave border communities facing uncertainty. De-escalation should therefore be pursued through reciprocal, verifiable steps and clear arrangements, not by pretending that reduced tension settles the boundary. India can maintain defensive preparedness while seeking lower-risk deployments, reliable communications and continued patrol arrangements consistent with agreed terms. This approach protects its negotiating position while making an accidental escalation less likely.

Cooperation need not erase competition. The September 2026 leaders’ meeting recorded India’s emphasis on peace at the border, observance of agreements and a fair, mutually acceptable boundary settlement; it also called for more business links, mobility and common ground on regional and global issues. Water-data exchange, disaster coordination, people-to-people contacts and practical work in forums such as BRICS are worthwhile when they deliver reciprocal benefits. They should proceed alongside, not in place of, candid discussions about the LAC, market access and economic imbalance.

India’s strongest course is patient and clear-eyed: keep the border secure, insist that commitments be honoured, invest in resilience, and preserve channels that can manage disagreement. Firm diplomacy neither assumes goodwill nor rules out cooperation. It judges progress by conduct, reciprocity and results—and gives India room to compete without making conflict the measure of every relationship.

Sources