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ARTICLE 25·STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND MAJOR-POWER RELATIONS

India–Russia Relations During the Ukraine War

As of 17 November 2026

Original editorial illustration for article 25: India–Russia Relations During the Ukraine War.
Original editorial illustration by Ibrahim Javaid. Conceptual scene, not to scale.

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINERStrategic autonomy and major-power relations

A closer look at the argument.

Open each layer to move from the article’s question, through its evidence, to the conclusion and limits.

01The question

As of 17 November 2026

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02The record

India’s continued engagement with Russia during the war in Ukraine is best understood as a difficult exercise in strategic autonomy. It has allowed New Delhi to preserve diplomatic access, protect established security and economic interests, and urge a negotiated end to the conflict. That policy deserves a defense, but not a blank cheque: India’s abstentions at the United…

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03What follows

India’s policy should therefore be judged by outcomes rather than by slogans about “balancing.” A durable approach would reduce excessive supplier dependence through domestic production and diversified partnerships; expand Indian exports so the economic relationship is less one-sided; keep communication open with both Russia and Ukraine; and state plainly that sovereignty and…

Read the article and sources

As of 17 November 2026

India’s continued engagement with Russia during the war in Ukraine is best understood as a difficult exercise in strategic autonomy. It has allowed New Delhi to preserve diplomatic access, protect established security and economic interests, and urge a negotiated end to the conflict. That policy deserves a defense, but not a blank cheque: India’s abstentions at the United Nations have carried real reputational costs, and its heavily imbalanced trade with Russia creates economic exposure that needs active management.

The starting point must be clear. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. India did not endorse that action. In the UN General Assembly, it abstained on Resolution ES-11/1, which condemned the aggression and demanded Russia withdraw its forces. India’s representative said the government was deeply concerned, called for an immediate ceasefire and humanitarian access, invoked the UN Charter and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and explained that India abstained “keeping in view the evolving situation in its entirety.” That record matters: India’s position was a deliberate diplomatic choice, not a vote for the invasion. Yet the distinction does not erase the criticism that abstaining from a direct condemnation weakened the collective signal against changing borders by force.

India’s voting record was not identical on every Ukraine resolution. In March 2022, it voted in favour of the General Assembly’s separate humanitarian resolution, ES-11/2, which addressed the conflict’s humanitarian consequences. India has also repeatedly called for dialogue and diplomacy, and its 2025 statement at the Assembly said that no solution could be found on the battlefield. It reported providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and described its approach as people-centred. Those actions show that New Delhi has sought to preserve contact with Moscow while maintaining channels with Kyiv and contributing to relief. A fair account should include both the abstention and this diplomatic and humanitarian record.

Why preserve the relationship? India and Russia built extensive ties over decades, including cooperation in defence, nuclear energy, space, trade, and multilateral forums. A sudden break during an active conflict would not automatically create new capabilities or eliminate existing dependencies; it could instead reduce India’s access and influence before alternatives were ready. The Indian government’s 2025 bilateral brief describes Russia as an important source of defence equipment, engines, spare parts, and components, while noting that cooperation has moved beyond a simple buyer–seller model toward joint research, development, and production. This is a practical strategic concern for a country responsible for securing a long land border and a large maritime region. It is not a reason to ignore the risks of relying on a single supplier; it is a reason to manage the transition carefully.

Energy and trade make the balance harder. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, India–Russia merchandise trade reached a record US$68.7 billion in fiscal year 2024–25. Indian exports were US$4.9 billion, while imports from Russia were US$63.8 billion; the major import categories included oil and petroleum products, fertilisers, vegetable oils, and coking coal. That scale can support India’s access to essential commodities, but the gap between imports and exports is a vulnerability, not a diplomatic victory. New Delhi and Moscow have set a goal of US$100 billion in trade by 2030, and their 2025 summit statement emphasized a more balanced and sustainable relationship, with greater Indian exports and industrial cooperation. Whether that goal produces resilient jobs and technology partnerships, rather than deepening dependence on a narrow set of imports, is the test.

The argument for engagement is not that trade makes the war acceptable. It is that India must account for its energy needs, supply chains, and the wider effects of disruption on developing economies. In the early months of the conflict, India highlighted pressure on food, fuel, and fertiliser security; at the same time, it called for a cessation of hostilities. These concerns do not belong only to India, and acknowledging them does not excuse violations of sovereignty. India’s best case is strongest when it applies its stated principles consistently: respect the UN Charter, oppose territorial acquisition by force, and insist that diplomacy address the human cost of war.

Engagement can also preserve a channel for direct messages. The Prime Minister met President Vladimir Putin at the 2025 annual summit and again at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS meetings in 2026. In September 2026, the official Indian readout said the leaders discussed the Black Sea conflict’s effects on maritime trade and Indian seafarers, and that India stood ready to assist in peace efforts. This demonstrates access and continuing dialogue; it does not prove that India can mediate successfully or that Moscow has accepted New Delhi’s preferred terms. India should describe its role modestly, offer help where the parties want it, and avoid implying that summit access alone is leverage.

The counterargument remains serious. Ukraine and many other states see a repeated abstention as inadequate support for the sovereignty principle India invokes. Continued trade can also make India appear to help Russia absorb economic pressure, even when Indian policy is framed around lawful commerce and domestic needs. These perceptions can complicate India’s partnerships with Europe and the United States and weaken its claim to speak for rules-based international conduct. New Delhi cannot control how every government interprets its choices, but it can reduce ambiguity by explaining its votes, supporting humanitarian measures, opposing attacks on civilians, and backing negotiations grounded in the UN Charter. It can also publish clearer information about the scope and safeguards of its trade and defence ties.

India’s policy should therefore be judged by outcomes rather than by slogans about “balancing.” A durable approach would reduce excessive supplier dependence through domestic production and diversified partnerships; expand Indian exports so the economic relationship is less one-sided; keep communication open with both Russia and Ukraine; and state plainly that sovereignty and territorial integrity apply to every country. Continued engagement is defensible when it serves these goals and helps keep a diplomatic route open. It becomes harder to defend if economic convenience displaces consistent principles or if access is mistaken for influence. India’s independent policy is strongest when autonomy carries clear obligations as well as choices.

Sources