Ibrahim Javaid
Tariffs are often presented as a binary choice: open the market or protect it. India’s recent customs policy points to a more deliberate approach. It uses duties to influence investment and industrial capacity, but also adjusts rates and exemptions to reduce costs for exporters, simplify rules, and support selected public priorities. The case for this sequencing is strongest when each tariff has a clear purpose, a review date, and evidence that it is helping Indian producers become more competitive.
The numbers need careful reading. The World Trade Organization’s 2026 India profile reports a simple-average most-favoured-nation (MFN) applied tariff of 15.8 per cent for 2025. It lists a simple-average bound rate of 48.5 per cent and binding coverage of 74.4 per cent. The applied rate is the general rate India notified for imports from WTO partners, subject to preferences and other provisions. A bound rate is a ceiling committed for a tariff line under WTO rules; it is not the rate routinely collected. Nor does a simple average mean that every import faces that percentage. These measures show both the overall structure and the policy room available, but businesses still need the tariff for their specific product code. (WTO India profile; WTO tariff data explanation)
The Union Budget’s stated goals are to simplify the tariff structure, support domestic manufacturing, promote export competitiveness, and correct “inversion” in duty—where inputs attract a higher rate than finished goods, making production in India more costly. The 2026–27 Budget proposed removing certain long-running exemptions where goods are now made in India or imports are negligible, and placing some effective rates directly in the Customs Tariff Schedule. It also distinguishes rate changes from administrative tidying: the explanatory memorandum says several tariff-line changes effective from 1 May 2026 would move existing effective rates into the schedule without changing the duty actually applicable. This matters because a changed line in a customs table is not necessarily a tariff increase or cut. (Union Budget 2026–27 speech; Explanatory Memorandum to Finance Bill 2026)
The sequence began earlier. In 2025, the government proposed removing seven industrial tariff rates, in addition to seven removed in 2023–24, leaving eight rate bands including zero. Yet it said a cess would broadly maintain effective duty incidence on most products, while some rates would fall and some lines would see a lower burden. The Budget also proposed limiting the use of multiple cesses or surcharges. That is tariff rationalisation, not blanket liberalisation: fewer headline bands can make the schedule easier to navigate without automatically lowering every importer’s bill. The government estimated the 2025 changes would forgo about ₹2,600 crore in indirect-tax revenue. (2025–26 Budget customs proposals)
The 2026–27 schedule illustrates the same calibrated logic. It lists a reduction from 20 per cent to 10 per cent for dutiable goods imported for personal use under heading 9804, effective 1 April 2026. It also sets out targeted changes for critical minerals, lithium-ion battery storage, solar glass, nuclear power, aviation maintenance, medicines, and other uses. Some are reliefs for manufacturing inputs; others remove exemptions or adjust rates. A schedule has many exceptions, so the applicable duty depends on the product’s classification, origin, and eligibility for a concession. The Budget is a guide to the policy direction; the tariff schedule and notifications govern the precise legal rate. (Budget 2026–27 customs tables; CBIC customs notifications)
Export-oriented sectors offer a concrete example of sequencing. The 2026 Budget proposed raising the duty-free import allowance for specified seafood-processing inputs from 1 per cent to 3 per cent of the previous year’s export turnover. It also proposed extending duty-free input treatment to shoe uppers and giving certain leather, footwear, and textile exporters a year rather than six months to export finished products. These measures recognise that duties on imported inputs can undermine an exporter’s price competitiveness. They are targeted to eligible goods and export activity, not open-ended waivers for all imports. The intended benefit—more competitive Indian exports—will still depend on demand, standards, productivity, and whether firms use the provisions. (Union Budget 2026–27 speech)
Sequencing also helps India pursue trade agreements without making every sector move at the same speed. A country may lower duties for a partner under an FTA while retaining a different MFN rate for others, in line with the agreement’s terms and WTO obligations. India’s recent trade deals use phase-ins, quotas, exclusions, and safeguards for sensitive products. That gives negotiators room to open markets where exporters are ready, while allowing adjustment time where a sudden import surge could hurt farmers or manufacturers. This is a policy argument for calibrated opening; it is not proof that every tariff protection has succeeded.
The counterargument is substantial. Higher tariffs can raise prices for households, increase input costs for domestic factories, and make Indian exports less competitive when their production depends on imported components. Frequent changes can also create uncertainty: firms need time to plan investments, and a duty that is repeatedly revised is hard to treat as a stable industrial signal. Protected producers may have less pressure to improve quality or productivity. These costs are why targeted, transparent design matters. A tariff should be reviewed against outcomes such as domestic capacity, input availability, export performance, and consumer prices—not defended indefinitely by the label “strategic.”
India’s tariff policy deserves support when sequencing is used as a bridge to competitiveness rather than a substitute for it. Simplifying schedules, correcting inverted duties, and giving export sectors targeted input relief can help firms scale. Safeguards and transitions can make trade opening politically and economically durable. But the strongest long-term case is an India where more producers can compete without permanent tariff shelter. Clear product-level rules, predictable notifications, periodic reviews, and public evaluation would keep the policy disciplined. Strategic sequencing means choosing the pace of opening carefully—and proving that each step leaves Indian businesses better prepared for global competition.