Ibrahim Javaid
Manufacturing policy is now part of foreign policy. Countries compete to attract factories, secure critical inputs and gain a reliable place in global supply chains. India’s Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) programme is a response to that competition: instead of relying only on lower costs or broad tax relief, it offers eligible firms incentives tied to incremental output in selected sectors. The decision is strategically sound because India needs more production capacity at home. Its success, however, should be judged by lasting productivity and domestic capability, not by the size of announcements.
The programme began in 2020 and now spans 14 sectors, from electronics and pharmaceuticals to solar modules, food processing and automobiles. The approved outlay is about ₹1.91 lakh crore, as set out in the government’s latest programme overview. The design varies by sector, but generally rewards firms after they meet specified investment, production or sales thresholds. This makes PLI a form of industrial statecraft: public money supports capacity in areas where scale, technology and supply security matter, while payments depend on firms delivering measurable activity.
The geopolitical case is straightforward. The pandemic exposed the risks of relying on narrow sources for essential goods. At the same time, governments are competing to host production in electronics, medicines, batteries, clean energy equipment and other strategic industries. India’s large domestic market, growing workforce and trade links give it a credible base from which to attract investment. Building factories and supplier networks in India can provide companies with another production location and give New Delhi more options when supply routes are disrupted. The aim is not self-sufficiency in every input; it is to reduce avoidable dependence and become useful to partners that want resilient supply chains.
The latest official figures show activity beyond commitments. As of 30 June 2026, 791 applications had been approved across the schemes. The Government reported ₹2.588 lakh crore in actual cumulative investment, ₹23.79 lakh crore in production and sales, ₹15.53 lakh crore in exports, and 14.57 lakh direct and indirect jobs. It also reported ₹36,754 crore in cumulative incentive disbursements, according to the 13 November 2026 PIB backgrounder. These are reported scheme outcomes, not the same thing as the full approved budget or a forecast. The gap between the ₹1.91 lakh crore outlay and the incentives paid so far matters: the outlay is a ceiling for the programme, while disbursements depend on claims and eligibility.
Electronics offers a concrete example. The Large Scale Electronics Manufacturing scheme completed its tenure with participating companies reporting ₹20,580 crore in investment, ₹11.62 lakh crore in production, 169,249 direct jobs, and ₹19,091 crore in incentives through June 2026. India’s electronics production and exports have also risen substantially over the past decade, while phone imports have declined. The PLI programme is one contributor to that shift, alongside the market, infrastructure, tax and trade conditions that influence companies’ decisions. Scheme figures show that production took place under participating firms; they do not prove that every rupee of output or export was caused by the incentive.
The first recent cross-sector assessment adds useful nuance. NITI Aayog’s November 2026 report, prepared with IIM Ahmedabad, assesses firm-level data across all 14 sectors and groups target segments as “on track,” “partial impact,” “insignificant evidence,” or “data unavailable.” Its summary says nearly 70 per cent of targeted segments are on track and identifies progress in pharmaceuticals, mobile manufacturing, food processing, telecom, white goods, automobiles and drones. It also says more work is needed to deepen MSME participation, harmonise data and strengthen value addition and supply chains. That is a stronger basis for confidence than a list of promised investments, and a reminder that performance varies by sector.
There are real trade-offs. The ₹1.91 lakh crore approved outlay represents public resources that could otherwise fund infrastructure, skills or research. A scheme that rewards additional output may attract large manufacturers without automatically creating a broad domestic supplier base. Assembly can raise export totals while leaving high-value components, designs or intellectual property dependent on imports. Large minimum investment and turnover thresholds can also make it harder for smaller firms to qualify directly, even when they could become important suppliers. NITI’s call for deeper MSME participation recognises this challenge.
Another caution is attribution. Production, export and job totals reported under a programme are not an independent estimate of what would have happened without subsidies. Companies may invest for several reasons, and the evidence is not identical across sectors. The evaluation’s inclusion of partial, insignificant and unavailable categories is therefore important: it helps policymakers identify schemes that need redesign or clearer data instead of treating all 14 as equally successful. The government should publish comparable measures of domestic value addition, productivity, additional exports, jobs and fiscal cost over time. Incentives should remain time-bound and be revised when evidence shows weak results.
India was right to use a targeted, performance-linked tool to build manufacturing capacity in strategic sectors. The approach connects industrial ambition to production rather than relying on declarations alone, and the reported results show that several sectors have moved beyond plans into factories, sales and exports. But PLI is a platform, not a complete industrial strategy. Its lasting value will depend on whether domestic suppliers move up the value chain, smaller firms join production networks, workers gain durable skills, and Indian companies compete without permanent subsidy support. That is how India can turn manufacturing policy into geopolitical influence: by becoming a dependable producer whose capabilities matter to partners as well as to its own economy.