Ibrahim Javaid
Global supply chains have become a central arena of economic statecraft. Pandemic shutdowns, shipping disruptions, geopolitical tensions and export controls have shown how a concentrated source of components can become a strategic vulnerability. For India, the answer is not to make every product at home. It is to widen the number of reliable suppliers and customers while building domestic capability in sectors where scale, technology or security matter.
That distinction matters. Resilience is often confused with self-sufficiency, but an economy that cuts itself off from foreign inputs may become less competitive and less secure. A more durable strategy combines domestic production, diversified imports, access to overseas markets and reliable logistics. India’s recent approach—targeted manufacturing incentives alongside trade agreements and infrastructure investment—can be defended as an effort to create those options.
India has meaningful scale to build on. The Commerce Ministry reported total exports of US$863.1 billion in FY 2025–26, including US$441.8 billion in merchandise and US$421.3 billion in services, in its annual trade release. The figure shows the breadth of India’s external economic links, but export growth alone does not prove that supply chains are diversified or that local firms capture more value. It is a starting point for judging whether policy is turning market access into production capability.
The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes are one part of that effort. Across 14 sectors, the government approved a total outlay of ₹1.91 lakh crore to encourage incremental production, investment and exports. In a November 2026 update, the Ministry of Commerce reported that, as of 30 June, approved applications had recorded ₹2.58 lakh crore in actual investment, ₹23.79 lakh crore in cumulative production or sales, ₹15.53 lakh crore in exports, and more than 14.57 lakh direct and indirect jobs. These are government-reported programme totals, not an independent estimate of how much activity would have occurred without incentives. Still, they show that the schemes have moved beyond announcements into reported factory investment and output. The official PLI update also describes sectors where export growth and manufacturing capacity have expanded.
The strategic case is clearest where capabilities have wider spillovers. Electronics, batteries, pharmaceuticals, telecom equipment and solar modules can support broader industrial ecosystems, technical learning and export relationships. A domestic supplier base can also give Indian manufacturers more options when shipping lanes or overseas production are disrupted. But incentives should remain tied to measurable output and competitiveness. A subsidy that sustains high-cost production indefinitely would weaken resilience by making firms dependent on public support and raising costs for downstream users.
Infrastructure is just as important as factories. PM Gati Shakti gives ministries and states a shared platform for planning roads, railways, ports and other infrastructure together; the National Logistics Policy adds work on digitisation, standards, warehousing and coordination. The government’s assessment, conducted by DPIIT with the National Council of Applied Economic Research, estimates Indian logistics costs at 7.9 per cent of GDP. That is useful as a benchmark, though the figure depends on measurement methods and should not be treated as proof that any single initiative caused a decline. A Commerce Ministry release on the assessment describes the policy framework and its intended role in reducing friction between producers and markets.
The need to improve connectivity is not only an administrative concern. Time lost at ports, unpredictable transport and fragmented paperwork all affect whether a firm can reliably deliver a component or finished product. The World Bank’s 2023 Logistics Performance Index placed India 38th among 139 economies, six places higher than in 2018. The Bank’s later logistics indicators use a different methodology and no longer provide a single comparable ranking, so the 2023 position should be treated as a dated reference rather than a current league table. The World Bank explains the change in its logistics indicators.
India’s strategy also needs external openness. Participation in global value chains can give firms access to specialised inputs, technology, standards and larger markets. In its 2024 Country Economic Memorandum, the World Bank found that Indian firms linked to global value chains had stronger export performance and sold across more products and destinations; it also said India’s participation remained lower than that of many peers. This is evidence in favour of deeper integration, not a guarantee that every supply-chain link will deliver the same result. The World Bank’s analysis also warns that relatively high tariffs on intermediate and capital goods can raise trade costs and impede participation.
That warning is a necessary counterweight to industrial policy. Protecting an emerging industry may give it time to learn, but costly inputs can make the rest of the economy less competitive. Import restrictions can also prompt partners to diversify away from Indian suppliers. The test is therefore not whether a policy sounds self-reliant; it is whether it produces capable firms that can compete without permanent protection and keeps access to needed components dependable.
India’s trade agreements add another layer of resilience by opening markets and creating additional commercial relationships. A network of partners can reduce overdependence on any one destination, while clear rules make it easier for firms to plan investment and sourcing. Yet agreements do not create orders by themselves. Exporters still need reliable logistics, predictable standards, skilled workers, finance and the ability to meet rules of origin. Smaller firms need help navigating those requirements if the benefits are to reach beyond large companies.
The geopolitical value of this approach is practical. India can become more useful to manufacturers seeking additional production bases, while preserving room to choose where domestic capacity matters most. That role is strengthened by competitive exports and trustworthy delivery, not by claiming that India can replace every existing supplier. Success should be measured in sustained productivity, diversified sourcing and export destinations, domestic value added, and improved delivery reliability—not only approvals, investment announcements or headline output totals.
Building options is a sensible response to a less predictable trading environment. India’s mix of targeted incentives, infrastructure coordination and external market access has a credible strategic logic. Its durability will depend on implementation discipline: incentives must reward performance, infrastructure projects must improve actual freight movement, and trade policy must let domestic firms access affordable inputs. If those conditions hold, India can strengthen economic security while becoming more deeply connected to the world economy.