Ibrahim Javaid
India’s review of its trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is best understood as a decision to improve a major partnership, not to retreat from it. The ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) was signed in 2009 and entered into force on 1 January 2010. More than a decade later, trade patterns, supply chains and the needs of businesses have changed. Updating how the agreement works is a practical way to preserve access while addressing problems that have become clearer through its use.
The scale of the relationship makes the review important. India’s Department of Commerce reported bilateral trade of US$128.38 billion in the 2025–26 financial year, equal to 10.55 per cent of India’s global trade. The figure shows why ASEAN is central to India’s economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. An agreement covering trade in goods that does not work smoothly for businesses would leave opportunities unrealised on both sides.
The review is also grounded in a measurable imbalance. In 2024–25, India exported US$38.96 billion in goods to ASEAN and imported US$84.16 billion, according to the Commerce Ministry’s annual report, leaving a goods deficit of about US$45.2 billion. The number is a reason to examine how the agreement operates, but it does not by itself prove that AITIGA caused the gap or that every import is harmful. India buys important inputs from the region, including coal, crude and refined palm oil, and petroleum products. These support energy, manufacturing and food supply. The useful policy question is whether Indian firms can compete for more regional demand and whether agreed preferences are being applied transparently and predictably.
India and ASEAN launched the review in May 2023. The Indian government said the process would make the pact more effective, user-friendly, simple and trade-facilitative, while addressing injury to industries and what it described as inequitable tariff liberalisation. Those are legitimate goals for a review of a mature agreement. Tariff preferences have little value if small exporters cannot understand the paperwork, if rules of origin are difficult to use, or if customs and regulatory procedures add costs that erase the tariff saving.
The negotiations cover the practical architecture of trade. At the 13th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting in New Delhi in July 2026, India and the ten ASEAN member states discussed rules of origin, customs procedures and trade facilitation, national treatment, and market access. The committee urged its subcommittees to finalise outstanding chapters and set time-bound deliverables. That agenda points toward a more usable agreement: clearer documentation, reliable customs processes, and rules that give genuine producers the benefit of preferences without allowing goods from third countries to be routed through a member simply to avoid tariffs.
The review matters strategically as well as commercially. ASEAN is a key set of partners for India’s Act East policy and its wider engagement across the Indo-Pacific. Regular trade ties create a practical basis for cooperation in logistics, manufacturing, food and energy security, and regional connectivity. Better trade rules could help Indian producers become more closely involved in Southeast Asian supply chains and give ASEAN firms more predictable access to India’s large market. That is a form of economic statecraft: strengthening interdependence through rules that businesses can actually use.
As of 17 November 2026, the review had not been concluded. At the September 2026 ASEAN–India Economic Ministers’ consultation, India described the process as ongoing and called for an outcome that is balanced, mutually beneficial, effective and trade-facilitative. ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn said on 14 November that ASEAN aims to conclude the review in 2027. That target is evidence of continuing political intent, not a completed deal. Until negotiations finish and any changes are formally adopted, the existing AITIGA rules remain the operative framework.
A fair assessment must include the concerns of ASEAN members too. India’s push to address trade asymmetries cannot mean that partners should absorb all adjustment costs or that India can assume a larger export share will follow from revised text. A complicated renegotiation could unsettle businesses that already rely on existing preferences. Stricter origin checks or slower customs procedures could raise costs for legitimate supply chains, while abrupt tariff changes could affect consumers and manufacturers that depend on imported inputs. A durable outcome therefore needs reciprocal benefits, clear transitions, and transparent safeguards. It should also track outcomes such as preference use, export diversification and resolution of non-tariff barriers, rather than claim success from a new document alone.
India is right to seek a more balanced and business-friendly AITIGA. The country’s growing trade with ASEAN makes disengagement a poor answer; stronger implementation and clearer rules offer a more constructive path. The review gives India and its partners a chance to make an established agreement fit current commerce while respecting legitimate sensitivities. If the parties conclude it with practical rules and then help firms use them, India can deepen its ASEAN partnership and expand the share of regional trade that supports Indian production and jobs. The case for the review is strong. Its success will depend on the terms negotiated and how faithfully they are put to work.