Ibrahim Javaid
India’s trade policy is strongest when it connects market access to long-standing strategic relationships. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Oman does that. Signed in Muscat on 18 December 2025, ratified by Oman in February 2026, and in force from 1 June 2026, it turns a political partnership into a predictable framework for goods and services trade.
The relationship has a firm foundation. India and Oman established diplomatic relations in 1955 and elevated them to a Strategic Partnership in 2008. Oman is also an interlocutor in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League and Indian Ocean Rim Association, according to India’s Ministry of External Affairs. CEPA fits an established relationship and can reinforce cooperation carried by political ties and business networks.
The most immediate commercial change is market access. Oman offers zero-duty entry for 98.08 per cent of its tariff lines, covering 99.38 per cent of India’s exports by value. Before CEPA, only 15.33 per cent of Indian exports reportedly entered Oman duty-free under most-favoured-nation terms. Lower tariffs improve price competitiveness in textiles, footwear, gems and jewellery, engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, marine products and processed food. They do not guarantee sales, but remove one cost barrier. The Commerce Ministry’s agreement summary lists the tariff coverage and sectors.
Smaller firms may benefit if they can find buyers, meet standards and use the agreement’s rules of origin. Early implementation data show activity: the Commerce Ministry reported 783 preferential Certificates of Origin under CEPA and an increase in tariff lines exported to Oman from 2,879 in May 2026 to 3,371 in June. These are utilization indicators, not proof of sustained export growth or jobs. (PIB implementation update, 18 August 2026.)
Services are another important part of the deal. Oman made commitments across 127 services subsectors, including professional, computer, education and health services. CEPA provides temporary entry and stay for specified categories of professionals, including intra-corporate transferees, contractual service suppliers, business visitors and independent professionals. The intra-corporate transferee ceiling rises from 20 per cent to 50 per cent of a service supplier’s personnel. These are bounded commitments, not blanket work permits: eligibility, licensing and domestic regulation still apply. The Omani services schedule sets out the specific limits.
The framework also aligns with Oman’s economic diversification plans. Oman’s Foreign Ministry links CEPA to Oman Vision 2040 and lists infrastructure, manufacturing, technology, food security and logistics as shared interests. Oman’s Arabian Sea ports at Sohar, Duqm and Salalah can support trade links, while Indian firms bring strengths in engineering, digital services, pharmaceuticals and food processing. The governments’ joint statement says the pact is intended to reduce barriers and create a stable framework.
The port geography is valuable, but it should be described carefully. Oman can serve as a logistics link for commerce with the Gulf and East Africa, yet CEPA preferences apply to qualifying bilateral trade under rules of origin. A product merely shipped through Oman does not automatically qualify for preferential entry into other markets. The agreement strengthens a corridor; it does not replace separate customs rules or regional trade arrangements.
India has also made a deliberate choice about what not to liberalize. Its offer covers 77.79 per cent of tariff lines, while products such as dairy, cereals, fruits and vegetables, edible oils, oilseeds, spices and other sensitive goods are excluded or subject to calibrated access. This keeps the agreement from treating all sectors as though they face the same adjustment pressures. The trade-off is real: protection can limit consumer choice and prevent some businesses from using cheaper inputs. But a negotiated agreement is more durable when it accounts for domestic concerns and earns public confidence. The design reflects a policy judgment that India can widen external trade while retaining room to protect food security and vulnerable producers.
There is evidence of a substantial existing commercial base, but the agreement’s impact is still too new to measure. India’s Commerce Ministry reported bilateral trade of US$11.18 billion in FY 2025–26, up from US$10.61 billion in FY 2024–25. Since the CEPA took effect only in June 2026, that annual comparison cannot be presented as an outcome caused by the pact. Likewise, 783 certificates issued and a broader range of exported tariff lines show that companies have begun to use the agreement, not that its long-term gains are assured. The next tests are sustained export growth, improved market participation by smaller firms, services projects that actually operate, and investments that move from announcements to implementation.
The India–Oman CEPA is a measured example of economic statecraft. It uses a close strategic partnership to secure broad access for Indian goods, clearer pathways for services, and cooperation in areas both countries want to develop. India preserved safeguards where domestic exposure is most sensitive, while accepting that protection carries its own costs. The deal does not guarantee exports or employment. It gives Indian businesses a stronger platform from which to pursue them—and gives policymakers a practical way to deepen India’s engagement across the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.