Ibrahim Javaid
The India–United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) shows how trade policy can reinforce a wider geopolitical partnership. They share maritime commerce, close people-to-people links, and complementary economic interests. The CEPA gave that relationship a practical framework: reduce trade barriers, set common procedures, and create forums to address problems as businesses use the agreement.
The agreement was signed on 18 February 2022 and entered into force on 1 May that year. India’s Ministry of Commerce describes it as a comprehensive pact covering goods, services, rules of origin, customs procedures, technical and sanitary standards, dispute settlement, movement of natural persons, intellectual property, investment, and pharmaceuticals. The UAE’s Ministry of Economy also presents the CEPA as a way to widen market access and simplify trade procedures. This breadth matters because modern economic ties depend on more than tariffs: exporters also need predictable certification, transparent rules, and ways to resolve regulatory obstacles.
For Indian exporters, the tariff schedules were substantial. India’s official CEPA FAQs say the UAE committed to eliminate tariffs on more than 97 percent of its tariff lines, accounting for about 99 percent of India’s exports to the UAE by value. Around 80 percent of the UAE’s tariff lines received immediate elimination, with more reductions scheduled over time. India also opened more than 90 percent of its tariff lines to the UAE. The bargain was therefore reciprocal, though the schedules and sectors differed on each side.
India also used exclusions and phased commitments to address domestic sensitivities. Its schedule kept dairy, cereals, many agricultural products, most automobiles and components, and other categories out of tariff elimination; gold jewellery access was managed through a quota. This is a useful feature of trade diplomacy: policymakers can seek export opportunities while limiting abrupt exposure in sectors where adjustment would be difficult. The agreement also includes a pharmaceuticals annex designed to facilitate recognition and registration for qualifying products, alongside commitments in services such as business, communications, education, health, tourism, and transport.
Trade figures since implementation are encouraging, but they should be read carefully. India’s Ministry of Commerce reported that bilateral merchandise trade rose from US$43.3 billion in FY 2020–21 to US$83.7 billion in FY 2023–24, then crossed US$100.06 billion in FY 2024–25. The Government of India’s 2026 visit brief records US$101.25 billion for FY 2025–26. India’s non-oil exports to the UAE reached US$27.4 billion in FY 2023–24, and the ministry reported growth in products including electrical equipment, machinery, chemicals, and smartphones. These figures show that trade continued to expand after the CEPA began, but they do not prove that the agreement alone caused every increase. Oil prices, gold flows, re-exports through the UAE, exchange rates, and wider demand also influence total trade.
A more specific measure of business use is the number of Certificates of Origin issued to claim preferential treatment. India’s 2025 review reported nearly 240,000 such certificates since implementation, linked to US$19.87 billion of exports to the UAE. A later 2026 government update reported 445,000 certificates. The numbers indicate that firms are using the agreement’s tariff preferences; they should not be treated as a direct estimate of additional trade that would not otherwise have occurred. Even so, growing use suggests that the CEPA is becoming part of normal export planning rather than remaining only a diplomatic announcement.
The agreement’s institutional machinery is equally important. At their third Joint Committee meeting in November 2025, India and the UAE reviewed market access, data sharing, gold tariff-rate quotas, anti-dumping matters, services, rules of origin, and Indian standards licensing. They also discussed pharmaceutical regulation and issues with Certificates of Origin. This record shows that a signed agreement does not automatically remove every barrier. It creates an agreed setting in which governments can identify problems and work toward solutions. For smaller exporters, resolving these practical issues can matter as much as headline tariff schedules.
The CEPA also fits a larger strategic relationship. At a May 2026 visit, the two governments reported bilateral merchandise trade of US$101.25 billion and set a new target of US$200 billion by 2032. Their cooperation now spans energy security, investment, food safety, space, advanced computing, defence, and skills, as reflected in recent bilateral outcomes. The two countries have also put a local-currency settlement arrangement in place for trade and remittances, alongside wider economic ties described by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These initiatives do not all arise from the CEPA, but they show how an economic agreement can sit within a broader set of partnerships that make the relationship more resilient.
There are genuine tests ahead. The trade relationship is not automatically balanced, and gross bilateral totals can obscure the role of oil and re-export flows. Preferential access has value only if Indian firms can meet standards, use the rules of origin, and compete on price and quality. India and the UAE will need to track the agreement’s effect on smaller exporters, services providers, farmers, and consumers, while continuing to resolve regulatory frictions. India’s Ministry of Commerce has also kept the target for non-oil, non-precious-metal trade distinct from the overall bilateral trade target; those measures should not be confused.
India’s decision to negotiate the CEPA was a practical form of strategic statecraft. It opened a major nearby market, protected selected domestic sensitivities, and established channels for continuing economic dialogue with a key Gulf partner. The strongest case for the agreement is not that it guarantees prosperity, but that it gives businesses clearer terms and gives governments a mechanism to deepen cooperation. Its lasting success will depend on whether both sides turn those terms into diversified trade, investment, jobs, and stronger links between their firms.