Ibrahim Javaid
India’s recent trade diplomacy is sometimes described as a retreat from globalisation because the country declined to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2019. The record since then points to a more selective approach. India has continued negotiating and implementing trade agreements, but it has tried to tailor them partner by partner. The case for this strategy is that market access should be reciprocal and workable for Indian producers, exporters, workers, and consumers. Its test is whether the agreements deliver measurable results.
The timeline is important. India did not sign RCEP in the form on offer in 2019, saying that the structure did not resolve its outstanding concerns. Since then, India has implemented agreements with Mauritius, the United Arab Emirates, Australia, and the European Free Trade Association. The Ministry of Commerce’s 2026 summary records that the EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in October 2025, the India–Oman CEPA in June 2026, and the India–UK CETA in July 2026. The same summary lists the India–New Zealand agreement as awaiting ratification and says India–EU FTA negotiations concluded in January 2026. It notes that the February 2026 India–US interim trade framework was still under negotiation. These different statuses matter: a signed text, a concluded negotiation, and an agreement in force are not interchangeable.
This sequence shows that India has not rejected trade agreements as a category. Instead, it has pursued a mix of bilateral and regional deals at different speeds. Each partner brings a different set of opportunities and sensitivities. An agreement with the UAE can serve India’s commercial links to the Gulf; an agreement with Australia can widen access in a developed market; and an EFTA deal involves countries with investment and technology strengths. The design of each agreement can be adjusted to the partners’ trade patterns and to India’s domestic priorities.
The government’s stated trade policy is built around access, fairness, and reciprocity. In a 2026 parliamentary reply, the Commerce Ministry said India’s agreements are intended to expand market access and trade and investment, and described them as aiming for balanced and equitable terms. These are official objectives, not proof that every agreement has already achieved them. Still, the principle is sensible: a trade deal should be assessed by what each side can actually sell, invest, and produce under its terms, rather than by the size of the signing ceremony or the number of partner countries.
A selective approach can also help policymakers manage adjustment. When tariffs fall, some firms gain cheaper inputs and larger markets, while others face new competition. In a country with varied levels of productivity across agriculture, manufacturing, and services, the pace and coverage of liberalisation can have uneven effects. Negotiators must consider rules of origin, customs procedures, product standards, safeguards, and the ability of small firms to use the agreement. India’s position is strongest when these concerns are identified in advance and addressed through evidence-based provisions, transition periods, and programmes that help firms adapt.
There are real risks in moving deal by deal. A growing collection of agreements can create different rules for each partner, raising compliance costs for firms that operate across markets. Smaller exporters may not have the staff or legal advice to understand each agreement’s rules of origin and documentation requirements. Preferential tariffs matter only if businesses can use them. The World Bank’s 2024 India Development Update argues that India’s export competitiveness also depends on lowering trade costs, improving customs transparency, reducing barriers, and helping exporters access imported inputs. Its assessment is a useful reminder that market access abroad must be matched by efficiency at home.
The World Bank also presents a counterargument to remaining outside large trade blocs: regional integration may bring substantial gains, and exclusion can redirect investment and supply chains toward members. Its estimates are model-based scenarios, not observed effects or guarantees. They do, however, underline the opportunity cost of staying out. India should therefore treat its 2019 RCEP decision as a judgment about the agreement’s terms at that time, not a permanent refusal to consider wider regional integration. If the terms change and domestic readiness improves, a fresh assessment would be prudent.
A defensible trade strategy needs regular measurement. For each agreement, India should publish clear data on exports, imports, investment, utilisation by small and medium enterprises, job effects, and sectors that need adjustment. It should compare the promised market access with the access Indian firms actually receive, including non-tariff barriers and standards. Such reviews can guide future negotiations and help the public distinguish genuine benefits from expectations that have not yet materialised.
India’s selective trade policy is most convincing when it pairs caution with ambition. The country should keep opening markets where the terms support its development goals, while investing in the logistics, skills, quality infrastructure, and predictable rules that make exporters competitive. It should keep negotiating with major economies, work through ASEAN and other regional forums, and remain willing to revisit agreements when evidence shows that a better balance is possible.
Trade policy is part of geopolitics because access to markets, technology, investment, and supply chains affects a country’s freedom of action. India can defend the decision to reject terms it considered unsuitable and still recognise that deeper integration may serve its future interests. The strongest case is not that every agreement must be accepted or refused. It is that India should negotiate with clear priorities, measure the results, correct weaknesses, and keep the door open to deals that offer durable gains for both sides.